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ABSTRACT 
Although the government’s data-mining program relied heavily on in-
formation and technology that the government received from private compa-
nies, relatively little of the public outrage generated by Edward Snowden’s 
revelations was directed at those private companies.  We argue that the mys-
tique of the Internet giants and the myth of contractual consent combine to 
mute criticisms that otherwise might be directed at the real data-mining mas-
terminds.  As a result, consumers are deemed to have consented to the use of 
their private information in ways that they would not agree to had they known 
the purposes to which their information would be put and the entities – in-
cluding the federal government – with whom their information would be 
shared.  We also call into question the distinction between governmental ac-
tors and private actors in this realm, as the Internet giants increasingly ex-
ploit contractual mechanisms to operate with quasi-governmental powers in 
their relations with consumers.  As regulators and policymakers focus on how 
to better protect consumer data, we propose that solutions that rely upon 
consumer permission adopt a more exacting and limited concept of the con-
sent required before private entities may collect or make use of consumer’s 
information where such uses touch upon privacy interests. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 2013, Edward Snowden, a contractor working for the National Secu-
rity Agency (“NSA”), shared with journalists from the Manchester Guardian 
information revealing that the NSA was engaged in a massive data-mining 
operation that enabled the NSA to eavesdrop on the telephonic and electronic 
communications of U.S. citizens and residents.1  On June 5, 2013, Guardian 
reporter Glenn Greenwald published the first2 of a long series of articles (and 
now also a book)3 in which he revealed that the NSA was collecting the 
phone records of millions of Verizon customers daily.4  That same day, 
 
 1. See GLENN GREENWALD, NO PLACE TO HIDE: EDWARD SNOWDEN, THE NSA, 
AND THE U.S. SURVEILLANCE STATE 20–32 (2014) (detailing the author’s initial con-
tacts with Snowden and the nature of the Snowden revelations). 
 2. Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon 
Customers Daily, THE GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order. 
 3. GREENWALD, supra note 1. 
 4. The swift response to this “revelation” is somewhat mysterious, as The New 
York Times reported on precisely this sort of government surveillance through the 
telecommunications providers back in 2005.  James Risen & Eric Lichtbau, Bush Lets 
U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2005), http://www.
nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/bush-lets-us-spy-on-callers-without-
courts.html?_r=0.  Glenn Greenwald, the journalist who broke the Snowden revela-
tions, published a best-selling book in 2006 detailing the NSA’s warrantless wiretap-
ping program that the Bush Administration launched in 2001.  GLENN GREENWALD, 
HOW WOULD A PATRIOT ACT? DEFENDING AMERICAN VALUES FROM A PRESIDENT 
RUN AMOK (2006).  See also David S. Kris, On the Bulk Collection of Tangible 
Things, 7 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 209, 210–11 (2014) (observing that the bulk col-
lection of telephone metadata disclosed by Edward Snowden had occurred previously 
and was the cause of litigation, but the U.S. government had never confirmed that 
such collection took place).  The American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) filed a 
number of lawsuits challenging the practice, and Congress eventually granted immun-
ity to the telecommunications companies for their role in such surveillance.  See In re 
NSA Telecommc’ns Records Litig., 483 F. Supp. 2d 934, 937 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (re-
counting allegations that Verizon Communications, Inc. disclosed telephone records 
to the NSA in violation of California residential customers’ privacy rights); Al-
Haramain Islamic Found. v. Bush, 451 F. Supp. 2d 1215, 1218 (D. Or. 2006) (detail-
ing allegations that the NSA engaged in electronic surveillance of communications 
between plaintiff’s directors and third parties in violation of FISA), rev’d, 507 F.3d 
1190 (9th Cir. 2007); Terkel v. AT&T Corp., 441 F. Supp. 2d 899, 901 (N.D. Ill. 
2006) (recounting allegations that AT&T provided to the NSA records of telephone 
calls of its customers in violation of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 
U.S.C. § 2702(a)(3) (2000 & Supp. IV 2005)); Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 
2d 974, 978 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (recounting plaintiffs’ allegations that AT&T collabo-
rated with the NSA in an illegal and massive warrantless surveillance program); 
ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 758 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (summarizing plaintiffs’ 
constitutional and statutory challenges to the NSA’s terrorist surveillance program), 
vacated, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007). 
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Greenwald reported on the NSA’s PRISM program, through which it gained 
access to data collected by technology companies including Google, Face-
book, Apple, Microsoft, YouTube, and other U.S. Internet service and tele-
phone communications providers.5  According to the Guardian, the PRISM 
program went beyond mere data mining.  It gave the NSA direct access to 
these companies’ systems, so that it could access “email, video and voice 
chat, videos, photos, voice-over-IP – Skype, for example – chats, file trans-
fers, social networking details, and more.”6 
The media were quick to respond.  Edward Snowden became a house-
hold name, and debates rage over whether he is a hero or a traitor.7  Condem-
 
Congress responded by amending the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to im-
munize telecommunications companies from liabilities that might arise from their 
participation in government-authorized surveillance of their customers: 
 
[N]o action, claim, or proceeding shall lie or be maintained in any court, and 
no penalty, sanction, or other form of remedy or relief shall be imposed by 
any court or any other body, against any person for the alleged provision to an 
element of the intelligence community of any information (including records 
or other information pertaining to a customer), facilities, or any other form of 
assistance, during the period of time beginning on September 11, 2001, and 
ending on the date that is the effective date of this Act, in connection with any 
alleged classified communications intelligence activity that the Attorney Gen-
eral or a designee of the Attorney General certifies, in a manner consistent 
with the protection of State secrets, is, was, would be, or would have been in-
tended to protect the United States from a terrorist attack.  This section shall 
apply to all actions, claims, or proceedings pending on or after the effective 
date of this Act. 
 
H.R. 3321, 110th Cong. § 5(a) (2007); Federal Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 
Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (2008). 
 5. Glenn Greenwald & Ewan MacAskill, NSA Prism Program Taps in to User 
Data of Apple, Google and Others, THE GUARDIAN (June 7, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data. 
 6. Id.  See also Laura K. Donohue, Section 702 and the Collection of Interna-
tional Telephone and Internet Content, 38 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 117, 124 (2015) 
(finding that certain government data collection programs exceeded the government’s 
authority to engage in such collection under the Constitution’s Fourth Amendment); 
Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and Constitutional Consid-
erations, 37 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 757, 760 (2014) (highlighting statutory and 
constitutional infirmities in the NSA’s data collection operations and calling for a 
legislative response); David S. Kris, On the Bulk Collection of Tangible Things, 7 J. 
NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 209, 213–23 (describing the operations of NSA surveillance 
programs the existence of which the government has confirmed). 
 7. See, e.g., G. Michael Fenner, Edward Snowden: Hero or Traitor, NEB. 
LAWYER 13, 21 (Nov./Dec. 2014) (concluding that it is too soon to tell whether 
Snowden is a hero, a traitor, or both); Mary-Rose Papandrea, Leaker Traitor Whistle-
blower Spy: National Security Leaks and the First Amendment, 94 B.U. L. REV. 449, 
454 (2014) (contending that government employees who leak secret information are 
entitled to First Amendment protections so long as they are neither traitors nor spies); 
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nation of the NSA’s PRISM program was nearly universal.8  But while a 
wave of outrage was directed at the government agency, the private compa-
nies that provided the government with their customers’ information largely 
escaped criticism or condemnation.9  This is striking because if the NSA act-
 
Katy Steinmetz, The Edward Snowden Name Game: Whistle-Blower, Traitor, Leaker, 
TIME (July 10, 2013), http://newsfeed.time.com/2013/07/10/the-edward-snowden-
name-game-whistle-blower-traitor-leaker/ (citing a Quinnipiac poll in which 55% said 
they consider Snowden a “whistleblower,” 34% consider him a traitor, and 11% could 
not choose between the two).  Unsurprisingly, U.S. Director of National Intelligence 
James Clapper denounced Snowden’s conduct as “reprehensible,” while Glenn 
Greenwald argued that people who leak classified information to journalists are “he-
roes.”  Glenn Greenwald, On Whistleblowers and Government Threats of Investiga-
tion, THE GUARDIAN (June 7, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/
2013/jun/07/whistleblowers-and-leak-investigations. 
 8. See Timothy B. Lee, Here’s Everything We’ve Learned About How the 
NSA’s Secret Programs Work, WASH. POST (June 25, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/06/25/heres-everything-
weve-learned-about-how-the-nsas-secret-programs-work/ (stating that PRISM is “a 
system for expediting the delivery of private information after company lawyers have 
scrutinized a government request”); Massive NSA Phone Data-Mining Operation 
Revealed, ACLU (June 5, 2013), https://www.aclu.org/national-security-technology-
and-liberty/massive-nsa-phone-data-mining-operation-revealed (ACLU criticizes 
NSA’s PRISM Program); Charles Savage, Edward Wyatt & Peter Baker, U.S. Con-
firms That It Gathers Online Data Overseas, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/07/us/nsa-verizon-
calls.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (summarizing criticism of the NSA’s PRISM Pro-
gram); Christopher Zara, Jim Sensenbrenner, Republican Author of Patriot Act, Says 
NSA PRISM Surveillance Goes Too Far, INT’L BUS. TIMES (June 9, 2013), 
http://www.ibtimes.com/jim-sensenbrenner-republican-author-patriot-act-says-nsa-
prism-surveillance-goes-too-far-1297697 (explaining that the author of the Patriot Act 
continues to criticize NSA’s PRISM Program); but see Brett Logiurato, The NSA’s 
PRISM Program Is Shockingly Uncontroversial with the American Public, BUS. 
INSIDER (June 17, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/prism-surveillance-poll-
nsa-obama-approval-2013-6 (characterizing a recent poll as suggesting that the Amer-
ican response to the PRISM program was a “collective shrug”). 
 9. See Marc A. Thiessen, Leaks, Not the NSA Programs, Deserve Condemna-
tion, WASH. POST (June 10, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/marc-
thiessen-leaks-not-the-nsa-programs-deserve-condemnation/2013/06/10/e91d09ac-
d1c9-11e2-a73e-826d299ff459_story.html (stating that critics focused on the NSA 
program rather than the implications of Snowden’s leaks); see also Barton Gellman & 
Ashkan Soltani, NSA Infiltrates Links to Yahoo, Google Data Centers Worldwide, 
Snowden Documents Say, WASH. POST (Oct. 30, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-
yahoo-google-data-centers-worldwide-snowden-documents-
say/2013/10/30/e51d661e-4166-11e3-8b74-d89d714ca4dd_story.html (showing the 
backlash against the NSA for mining data collected by Yahoo and Google); World-
wide Reaction to NSA/PRISM Surveillance – An Overview, INFOSECURITY MAG. (June 
12, 2013), http://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/worldwide-reaction-to-
nsaprism-surveillance-an/ (revealing that the reaction to Snowden’s leaks tended to be 
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ed illegally, it was able to do so only because the Internet giants were already 
engaged in data mining.  Major telecommunications and Internet-based busi-
nesses regularly engage in highly invasive data mining, and they do so largely 
without negative consequences, even though their conduct is what makes 
NSA data mining possible.10  That is, the U.S. government lacks the surveil-
lance savoir faire of these private businesses.11  Private businesses harvest 
their customers’ data all the time with impunity. 
This Article explores the reasons why people are generally tolerant of 
private surveillance and argues that such surveillance is, if anything, more 
violative of privacy and personal autonomy than is government surveillance.  
We use the term “Internet giants” to refer to those technology companies that 
dominate the online environment, such as Google, Facebook, Yahoo, and 
Microsoft.  We argue that, due to their size and market dominance, these 
companies exercise quasi-governmental authority and monopoly power that 
makes consumer consent to data collection meaningless. 
In Part II, we discuss and reject three reasons often given for the lack of 
outrage at private surveillance.  First, the courts generally support the notion 
 
negative toward the NSA, rather than any other involved entities).  There is some 
evidence that the private companies that cooperated with the NSA did face a backlash 
in the form of lost international business.  See BRUCE SCHNEIER, DATA AND GOLIATH: 
THE HIDDEN BATTLES TO COLLECT YOUR DATA AND CONTROL YOUR WORLD 121–22 
(2015) (reporting that U.S. cloud computing providers suffered a backlash in 2013 
and may have lost between $22 and $35 billion in revenues over three years as com-
panies switched to Swiss or other countries perceived as neutrals); Laura K. Donohue, 
High Technology Consumer Privacy and US National Security, BUS. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2015), http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1457, at 4–6 (detailing 
revenues lost by U.S. companies as a result of their association with NSA data min-
ing); Susan Ariel Aaronson & Rob Maxim, Data Protection and Digital Trade in the 
Wake of the NSA Revelations, 48 INTERECONS. 281 (2013) (contending that Snow-
den’s revelations “have threatened U.S. leadership of the Internet, as well as Ameri-
can market share”). 
 10. The first top-secret document that Snowden leaked was an order from the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court allowing the NSA to subpoena metadata from 
Verizon.  In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Production of Tan-
gible Things from Verizon Business Network Services, Inc., No. BR:13-80 (FISC, 
Apr. 13, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/06/verizon-
telephone-data-court-order.  The second was a forty-one-slide PowerPoint presenta-
tion outlining the PRISM program.  Greenwald & MacAskill, supra note 5.  The 
government would not have had access to any of this information if the private com-
panies were not collecting and maintaining it for their own purposes.  Id.  As the NSA 
PowerPoint presentation notes, government access to metadata “is 100% dependent 
on ISP provisioning.”  Id. 
 11. See Barton Gellman & Laura Poitras, U.S., British Intelligence Mining Data 
from Nine U.S. Internet Companies in Broad Secret Program, WASH. POST (June 7, 
2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-
from-nine-us-internet-companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-
cebf-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_story.html (describing the NSA’s need to have pri-
vate companies grant access to their databases). 
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that people who use technology, including telephone and Internet service, 
agree to the Terms of Service (“TOS”) that the providers of those services 
furnish.  The Internet giants disclose in those TOS that they engage in data 
mining, or at least that they have the right to do so.   As a result, the argument 
goes, nobody should be outraged that the Internet giants engage in mining the 
data provided by the customers because the customers have consented to such 
use. 
Second, government data mining is more threatening than private data 
mining because the government has the power to detain, interrogate, arrest, 
and even, in certain circumstances, target individuals, including U.S. citizens, 
for killing.12  Private businesses data mine simply so that they can send con-
sumers advertisements and offers that will most likely interest them. 
Third, and relatedly, some argue that data mining by private companies 
do not harm consumers.  Private companies provide the public with useful 
products, and they use metadata to enhance those products and to deliver 
those products more efficiently to the consumers who desire them. 
In Part II, we argue that consumers have not given meaningful consent 
to private companies’ data mining.  We discuss survey data that indicates that 
consumers would not willingly choose to sacrifice their privacy in exchange 
for targeted advertising.  Finally, we discuss the ways in which private data 
mining harms ordinary consumers. 
In Part III, we go a bit further and argue that data mining by the Internet 
giants is, if anything, more objectionable than government data mining.  The 
Internet giants use data mining to shape and control the environment in which 
consumers use their products and services.  They do so without either trans-
parency or the sort of regulation and oversight to which government entities 
are subject.  In addition, specialized legislation immunizes them from the 
sorts of liability to which natural persons are exposed.  Companies use data 
mining to shape the lives of natural persons in myriad ways, ranging from 
terms and conditions of employment and the approval of individual credit to 
the cultural transformations of the reasonable expectation of privacy and con-
trol over intellectual property.  In so doing, the Internet giants undermine any 
meaningful distinction between private and governmental data mining.  Pri-
vate companies use data mining to override political consensus that has been 
achieved through democratic processes and to dictate to We the People, the 
conditions of our existences.  Corporate power allows private actors to under-
take governmental functions without being subject to democratic controls, 
 
 12. For arguments defending the legality of lethal drone strikes against U.S. 
citizens, see Alberto R. Gonzales, Drones: The Power to Kill, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1, 4 (2013) (recommending procedures to protect the rights of American citizens 
while also placing on a firmer legal footing the President’s power to order drone 
strikes against U.S. citizens and finding that the targeted killing of U.S. citizen Anwar 
Al-Aulaqi appears to have been justified); Marshall Thompson, The Legality of 
Armed Drone Strikes against U.S. Citizens within the United States, 2013 BYU L. 
REV. 153, 155 (contending that a drone strike against a U.S. citizen within the United 
States would be permissible under the law of armed conflict in certain circumstances). 
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and data mining is both a product of, and a tool to facilitate, this corporate 
usurpation of democracy. 
In Part IV, we return to our focus on the thin concept of consent as it 
applies to contract formation.  While conceding the market efficiencies that 
flow from form contracting generally, we contend that a more robust concept 
of consent ought to be applicable in the context of data mining that infringes 
on personal privacy.  Before corporations can harvest consumer data, they 
must disclose the purposes for which they will use that data, and consumers 
must specifically and expressly consent to those uses.  We believe that effec-
tive communication of data collection practices is possible only when the 
process by which companies elicit consumer consent affects the consumer 
experience.  We argue that the process of consent should be disruptive, not 
the seamless, nearly frictionless process that it is now.  There must be a mo-
ment when consumers are conscious of the fact that, by purchasing a product 
or services, they are agreeing to have their data collected in ways that are 
clearly identified and for purposes that are spelled out and to which they 
agree with specificity. 
Our aim here is not to condone government overreaching.  Rather, we 
intend to show that private data mining is just as objectionable and harmful to 
individual rights as is governmental data mining.  Moreover, because corpo-
rate actors are now empowered to use their technological advantages to ma-
nipulate and dictate the terms on which they interact with the public, they 
govern us in ways that can mimic and even supersede governance through 
democratic processes.  From this perspective, the distinction between private 
and public data mining becomes less significant.  The government relies on 
private companies to provide it with the metadata it needs for its data-mining 
projects, and private companies engage in data-mining practices about which 
we should be every bit as suspicious as we are about NSA data mining. 
I.  CONSUMERS, CONSENT, AND DATA MINING 
In this Part, we address three common arguments for why people do not 
object to data mining by private companies.  The most formidable argument 
is that consumers consent to data mining, among other things, when they 
agree to the TOS of the Internet giants and other private enterprises prior to 
making use of services provided by them.  Moreover, the argument goes, 
consumers actually want companies to mine their data because the companies 
use consumers’ data to provide useful goods and services.  In the alternative, 
the Internet giants contend, private data mining does no harm. 
We disagree with all three arguments.  First, we draw on the wealth of 
recent scholarship demonstrating that consumers have not consented in any 
meaningful way to the TOS that the law deems them to have accepted either 
through use of services or through the meaningless click that is purported to 
constitute consent to non-negotiable terms.  Most significantly, we contend 
that, while contractual consent may suffice to bind consumers to ordinary 
2015] INTERNET GIANTS AS QUASI-GOVERNMENTAL ACTORS 731 
commercial terms, privacy is different,13 and the contractual concept of con-
sent is insufficiently robust to be used as a vehicle for stripping citizens of 
their zone of privacy. 
Second, we summarize survey data that suggests that consumers actual-
ly do not want to sacrifice their privacy in exchange for the services that the 
Internet giants provide, such as targeted advertising.  Finally, because private 
companies do not fully disclose the nature of the data mining in which they 
engage or the purposes for which they use metadata, consumers really have 
no idea of the extent of the harms caused by private data mining. 
A.  What We Talk About When We Talk About Consent 
Companies routinely claim that users consent to extensive data collec-
tion practices by agreeing to the companies’ TOS.14  Facebook, a corporate 
giant with its hand perennially caught in the privacy cookie jar,15 recently 
found itself embroiled in yet another public controversy when researchers 
published a study revealing that Facebook had manipulated its users’ news 
feeds in order to evaluate whether doing so affected the nature of users’ posts 
and presumably their moods.16  The company’s response was that users con-
sented to this type of study by agreeing to its TOS.17 
Google similarly used the rhetoric of consent to justify its practice of 
scanning Gmail users’ emails.  Plaintiffs in a class action lawsuit against 
Google18 argued that the Internet giant’s practice of scanning users’ emails 
 
 13. There are other important rights that may be affected by adhesive contracts, 
but, in this Article, we focus primarily on privacy rights. 
 14. In making these claims, these companies are playing into the tendency of 
judges and even consumers to blame themselves for failing to read terms.  See Eric A. 
Zacks, Contracting Blame, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 169, 171 (2012) (“We have a tenden-
cy to blame the victim in retrospect, and the contract preparers ‘assist’ us in doing so 
by presenting contracts that reinforce the other party’s blameworthiness.”). 
 15. See Victor Luckerson, 7 Controversial Ways Facebook Has Used Your Data, 
TIME (Feb. 4, 2014), http://time.com/4695/7-controversial-ways-facebook-has-used-
your-data/ (outlining the various ways Facebook’s privacy settings affect user data); 
see also Vindu Goel & Edward Wyatt, Facebook Privacy Change Is Subject of F.T.C. 
Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/12/
technology/personaltech/ftc-looking-into-facebook-privacy-policy.html (describing 
the broad privacy settings for Facebook users and the implications of accepting those 
terms). 
 16. Vindu Goel, Facebook Tinkers with Users’ Emotions in News Feed Experi-
ment, Stirring Outcry, N.Y. TIMES (June 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/
06/30/technology/facebook-tinkers-with-users-emotions-in-news-feed-experiment-
stirring-outcry.html. 
 17. Id. (“The company says users consent to this kind of manipulation when they 
agree to its terms of service.”); cf. SCHNEIER, supra note 9, at 47 (“The overwhelming 
bulk of surveillance is corporate, and it occurs because we ostensibly agree to it.”). 
 18. In re Google Inc. Gmail Litig., No. 5:13-MD-02430-LHK (N.D. Cal. Sept. 
26, 2013). 
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violated the federal Wiretap Act, as amended by the Electronic Communica-
tions Privacy Act.19  The Wiretap Act prohibits the interception of “wire, oral 
or electronic communications” without “prior consent” to the interception.20 
Google first claimed that plaintiffs – who used Google’s Gmail service – 
consented to the terms of its online TOS21 and Privacy Policy which “essen-
tially stated throughout the class period that Google could use information 
from users to ‘[p]rovide, maintain, protect, and improve [its] services (includ-
ing advertising services) and develop new services.’”22  Google then argued 
that the plaintiffs’ claims under the Wiretap Act failed because they had ex-
pressly consented to the terms in its TOS and Privacy Policy and, thus, to the 
scanning.23 
However, users generally do not know that by clicking on an icon or 
hyperlink they are entering into a legally binding agreement.  Numerous tes-
timonies from consumers indicate that they often do not recall clicking on a 
link.24  Few consumers actually read even part of the terms, and fewer still, 
all of the terms in a TOS or privacy policy.  One study found that “only one 
or two of every 1,000 retail software shoppers access the license agreement 
and that most of those who do access it read no more than a small portion.”25  
Another study of retail software sales purchasers found that 1.4% of 222 test 
subjects reported reading end-user license agreements (“EULAs”) often, alt-
hough a greater percentage (24.8%) reported reading parts of the agreement 
 
 19. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (2012). 
 20. Id. 
 21. We use “TOS” to refer to both “terms of service” and “terms of use.” 
 22. Defendant Google’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Individual 
and Class Action Complaint: Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support 
Thereof, In re Google Inc. Gmail Litig., No. 5:13-MD-02430-LHK (N.D. Cal. June 
13, 2013), 2013 WL 3297861, at 4 (alterations in original) (citations omitted). 
 23. See id. at 23, lines 10–12 and 23–24, and at 24, lines 20–22 (“Under federal 
law, the consent of a single party to a communication is [a] complete defense  to any 
liability and so the consent of the Gmail user alone is sufficient to bar a claim. . . .  
Because the Gmail Plaintiffs are bound to Google’s TOS and/or Privacy Policy, they 
have expressly consented to the scanning disclosed in these terms. . . .  Because the 
Gmail Plaintiffs are bound to these terms as a condition of using Gmail, they cannot 
pursue a claim under ECPA, which precluded liability based on a single party’s con-
sent.”). 
 24. See Vernon v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., 857 F. Supp. 2d 1135, 1147 (D. 
Colo. 2012) (noting that plaintiff was unable to recall receiving a welcome letter or 
clicking accept), aff’d, 925 F. Supp. 2d 1185 (D. Colo. 2013); Fusha v. Delta Airlines, 
No. RDB–10–2571, 2011 WL 3849657 (D. Md. Aug. 30, 2011) (finding that plaintiff 
could not recall clicking on “Accept” hyperlink). 
 25. Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, Does Anyone 
Read the Fine Print?  Consumer Attention to Standard Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1, 1 (2014). 
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or browsing its contents.  Of those surveyed, 66.2% reported rarely reading or 
browsing EULAs, and 7.7% reported never having noticed or read them.26 
In a widely circulated story, Game Station, a computer game retailer, in-
cluded in its online contract the right to claim the “souls” of 7500 of its online 
customers.  Very few nullified the soul-claiming clause, even though they 
could have done so by clicking a box to opt-out, which would also have re-
warded them with a £5 voucher.  Given the number of people who did so, 
Game Station believes as many as 88% of people do not read the terms.27 
No one reads all of the terms every time that they enter into an online 
agreement.  Online terms are too long, they are often hyperlinked to other 
web pages containing more terms, the terms are dynamic and frequently up-
dated, and they are ubiquitous.28  It is simply impossible for consumers to 
give informed consent to all of the online contracts into which they enter.  No 
human being has the cognitive capacity or the time to read through every 
digital contract that he or she encounters.29 
It is not the adhesive nature of online terms that makes consent impossi-
ble.  While paper mass consumer contracts may also be one-sided and non-
negotiable, they are not inherently unreadable for the simple reason that they 
are tangible.  The cost of printing constrains the magnitude of terms and a 
business’s desire to update them.  By contrast, online contracts balloon to 
comic lengths, as illustrated by the iTunes TOS which, when printed in eight-
point font, extend to thirty-two pages of text elaborating the terms of a nine-
ty-nine cent transaction.30  These terms are frequently updated.31  But the 
problems associated with online contracting now extend to paper contracts as 
well because paper contracts now frequently incorporate online terms by ref-
erence. 
 
 26. Nathaniel S. Good, Jens Grossklags, Deirdre K. Mulligan, & Joseph A. Kon-
stan,  Noticing Notice: A Large-Scale Experiment on the Timing of Software License 
Agreements, paper presented to the Conference on Human Factors in Computing 
Systems, Apr. 28–May 3, 2007, San Jose, CA, http://people.ischool.berkeley.edu/
~jensg/research/paper/Grossklags07-CHI-noticing_notice.pdf (last visited July 17, 
2015). 
 27. 7,500 Online Shoppers Unknowingly Sold Their Souls, FOXNEWS (Apr. 15, 
2010), http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2010/04/15/online-shoppers-unknowingly-sold-
souls/.  We believe Game Station’s estimate is too high given the available studies 
and the existing cases.  See generally NANCY S. KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS: 
FOUNDATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS 85–86, 128–29 (2013) (citing examples of con-
sumer failure to notice terms and possible explanations). 
 28. See KIM, supra note 27, at 54–69. 
 29. See OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED 
TO KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 27 (2014) (“Reading all the pri-
vacy disclosures we received in 2008 would take each of us seventy-six work days, 
for a national total of over fifty billion hours – an opportunity cost greater than the 
GDP of Florida.”). 
 30. Id. at 24, Plate 1 (after page 134). 
 31. KIM, supra note 27, at 65–67. 
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The notion that users actually consent to online contracts is widely 
mocked in popular culture,32 yet the common law remains unchanged.  Courts 
continue to conclude that a click constitutes a “manifestation of assent,” de-
spite all evidence to the contrary.  Consumers acquiesce because they have no 
other meaningful choice.  The ubiquity of wrap contracts33 means that, in 
order to participate in modern life, consumers must act in a way that courts 
construe as consent.34  According to a recent column in The New York Times, 
one-third of the top websites require users to agree to some form of limitation 
on their legal rights – usually mandatory arbitration provisions and class-
action waivers.35  This might suggest that consumers have the ability to shop 
around for the best terms.  However, as indicated above, consumers have 
neither the time nor the information that would enable them to do so.  In any 
case, given recent Supreme Court jurisprudence favoring such provisions,36 it 
will not take long for other websites to catch up in the race to the bottom. 
Even if the sheer scope of online terms did not undermine the argument 
that users consent to terms, there is an additional problem.  Companies em-
ploy broadly-worded language and appeal to users’ optimism bias.  For ex-
 
 32. South Park: Human CentiPad (Comedy Central television broadcast Apr. 27, 
2011); Last Week Tonight with John Oliver (HBO television broadcast June 1, 2014), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fpbOEoRrHyU; Saturday Night Live: The Peo-
ple’s Court (NBC television broadcast Aug. 11, 1986). 
 33. By “wrap contract,” we refer to a unilaterally imposed set of terms that the 
drafter regards as legally binding.  See KIM, supra note 27, at 2–3.  Wrap contracts, 
encompassing shrinkwraps, clickwraps and browsewraps, are presented to non-
drafting parties in ways that have developed since the 1980s and generally do not 
involve the use of a pen.  See id. 
 34. After hearing about Facebook’s news feed manipulation study, many users 
responded with a shrug, not because they approved of the study, but because they 
have accepted that they have no choice, that “user participation has come to equal 
user consent, a social contract governed by massive terms-of-service agreements that 
few users fully read or understand.”  Matt Pearce, Facebook Experiment Becomes a 
Debate Over Power and Consent, L.A. TIMES (July 3, 2014, 5:52 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-nn-facebook-study-20140703-
story.html#page=1. 
 35. Jeremy B. Merrill, One-Third of Top Websites Restrict Customers’ Right to 
Sue, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/23/upshot/one-
third-of-top-websites-restrict-customers-right-to-sue.html?abt=0002&abg=1&_r=2. 
 36. See e.g., Am. Express Co. v. It. Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013) (up-
holding arbitration clause and class-action waiver in the face of a claim that the waiv-
er invalidated plaintiff’s access to meaningful redress under a federal anti-trust stat-
ute); AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (upholding a class action 
waiver notwithstanding plaintiffs’ claims that the waiver made the arbitration agree-
ment unconscionable in that it deprived plaintiffs of a meaningful remedy); Rent-a-
Ctr. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010) (permitting the arbitrator to decide the issue of 
whether a clause delegating decisions to the arbitrator was unconscionable); Stolt-
Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010) (finding that arbitrators 
exceeded their power when they construed an arbitration clause that was silent on 
class arbitration to permit class arbitration). 
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ample, the language in Facebook’s TOS, which ostensibly justified its news-
feed-manipulation study, stated: 
We use the information we receive about you in connection with the 
services and features we provide to you and other users like your 
friends, [our partners], the advertisers that purchase ads on the site, 
and the developers that build the games, applications, and websites 
you use. For example, in addition to helping people see and find 
things that you do and share, we may use the information we receive 
about you: 
 as part of our efforts to keep Facebook [products, services, and in-
tegrations] safe and secure; 
 [to protect Facebook’s or others’ rights or property]; 
 to provide you with location features and services, like telling you 
and your friends when something is going on nearby; 
 to measure or understand the effectiveness of ads you and others 
see, [including to deliver relevant ads to you]; 
 to make suggestions to you and other users on Facebook, such as: 
suggesting that your friend use our contact importer because you 
found friends using it, suggesting that another user add you as a 
friend because the user imported the same email address as you 
did, or suggesting that your friend tag you in a picture they have 
uploaded with you in it; [and 
 for internal operations, including troubleshooting, data analysis, 
testing, research and service improvement]. 
Granting us permission to use your information not only allows us to 
provide Facebook as it exists today, but it also allows us to provide 
you with innovative features and services we develop in the future that 
use the information we receive about you in new ways.37   
If a user were that rare creature who actually attempted to wade through 
Facebook’s terms, it is likely that he or she would have interpreted this provi-
sion to mean that Facebook would exploit user information only to improve 
 
 37. The language in brackets was added after the manipulation study was con-
ducted.  See Kashmir Hill, Facebook Added ‘Research’ to User Agreement 4 Months 
After Emotion Manipulation Study, FORBES (June 30, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/%20kashmirhill/2014/06/30/facebook-only-got-permission-to-do-research-on-
users-after-emotion-manipulation-study/. 
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its advertising, not that it would experiment on its users by manipulating their 
feeds. 
Similarly, Google has pointed to broad language in its terms to justify 
email scanning.  In In re Google, Inc. Gmail Litigation,38 Plaintiffs, while 
conceding that they had provided legal assent, argued that they did not con-
sent to email scanning, as the language did not specifically refer to it.39 
Companies may also use wrap contracts in an informal manner to shape 
public opinion and to gain acceptance for dubious business practices.  Com-
panies may justify a dubious practice with easily obtainable contractual con-
sent.  A contract legitimizes a new and dubious business practice, such as 
data collection or experimenting on users, and the constructed consent shifts 
the blame for the practice from the company to the user.  Tess Wilkinson 
Ryan found that “consumer choice is a very salient feature of how we under-
stand transactional harm,”40 and that, unless prompted to consider alternative 
explanations such as firm misbehavior, “subjects in these studies understood 
transactional harms as products of consumer consent.”41  Similarly, Eric 
Zacks argues that a contract can “encourage individuals to feel shame, to 
blame themselves,” which may deter them from challenging a contract’s en-
forceability.42  In other words, the contract serves as a powerful legitimizing 
tool for companies and may convince consumers, ex-post formation, to shift 
responsibility away from the companies engaging in dubious practices and 
toward users for failing to read and understand terms to which they “consent-
ed.” 
Internet-based companies also use shaming and blaming to shape public 
opinion and normalize dubious practices.  Typically, they downplay or belit-
tle negative public reaction as the result of naiveté, irrational conservatism, or 
ignorance of the way technical matters work, and they may characterize criti-
cisms as harmful to innovation.  Executive officers of Sun Microsystems, 
Facebook, and Google have all issued variations on the theme that privacy is 
of concern only for old fogies with something to hide.43  On OkCupid’s com-
pany blog, one of the founders of the dating website proudly confessed to 
 
 38. See In re Google, Inc. Gmail Litig., No. 5:13-MD-02430-LHK, 2014 WL 
1102660 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2014). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, A Psychological Account of Consent to Fine Print, 99 
IOWA L. REV. 1745, 1781 (2014). 
 41. Id. at 1782. 
 42. Eric A. Zacks, Shame, Regret and Contract Design, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 695, 
698 (2014). 
 43. Helen A.S. Popkin, Privacy Is Dead on Facebook.  Get Over It, NBC News 
(Jan. 13, 2010, 8:56 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/34825225/ns/technology_and
_science-tech_and _gadgets/t/privacy-dead-facebook-get-over-it/#.U-O_GWNYN19.  
See also Bobbie Johnson, Privacy No Longer a Social Norm, says Facebook Founder, 
THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 10, 2010), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2010/
jan/11/facebook-privacy. 
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experimenting on its users and even subtly mocked those who would be sur-
prised by such a disclosure, calling it “how websites work.”44 
Cognitive psychologists, scholars, and other researchers who study deci-
sion making have provided a multitude of other reasons why consumers may 
click “agree” to terms without actually agreeing to them.45  Consumers, in the 
face of ubiquitous, non-negotiable terms, may succumb to a kind of learned 
helplessness.  Believing that they are unable to negotiate terms, they do not 
even try to do so.46  They may be subject to the herd effect, thinking that 
there is no harm in accepting wrap contract terms because everyone else is 
doing it.  Optimism and overconfidence bias may make it easy for them to 
convince themselves that they will never be subject to harmful terms or that 
they will be able to appeal to the company to escape their enforcement.47 
In sum, courts apply a standard that is too easily met when the question 
is whether a consumer has consented to a contract.  They may well be right to 
do so in some situations, given the transactional efficiencies thereby 
achieved.  But courts should not restrict consumers’ privacy and other foun-
dational rights based on this anemic, non-specific, contractual consent. 
B.  Do Consumers Really Want Data Mining? 
The yawning gap between true consent and judicially-constructed con-
sent does not bother those who believe that wrap contract terms are harmless, 
as consumers would have agreed to them anyway, or that they are intended 
merely to stave off the claims of opportunistic consumers.48  Marketers claim 
that consumers want more tailored ads.  The Digital Advertising Alliance 
claimed that the “more Internet users learn about the protections and choices 
available to them, the more comfortable they become with online interest-
 
 44. Christian Rudder, We Experiment on Human Beings!, OKTRENDS (July 28, 
2014), http://blog.okcupid.com/index.php/we-experiment-on-human-beings/. 
 45. See generally Wilkinson-Ryan, supra note 40 (unpacking beliefs, prefer-
ences, assumptions, and biases that constitute our assessments of assent to boiler-
plate). 
 46. See Amy J. Schmitz, Pizza-Box Contracts: True Tales of Consumer Con-
tracting Culture, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 863, 888 (2010). 
 47. DANIEL KAHNEMAN & AMOS TVERSKY, Conflict Resolution: A Cognitive 
Perspective, in CHOICE, VALUES AND FRAMES 473 (2000). 
 48. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Com-
petitive Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827, 828 (2006) (discussing how one-
sided terms give companies protection against opportunistic consumers).  For more 
general defenses of the adequacy of constructive consent in most circumstances, see 
Randy E. Barnett, Contract Is Not Promise; Contract Is Consent, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 647 (2012); Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 627 (2002). 
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based advertising.”49  Yet, that statement, based upon a poll conducted on 
behalf of the Alliance, is misleading – the poll results indicate a public re-
signed to the advertising model of the Internet but concerned about the in-
formation collected by marketers.50  We are skeptical that hordes of consum-
ers affirmatively want better-targeted advertisements, and we believe fewer 
still would want it if they understood the extent of the data collection required 
to create targeted advertisements. 
We are not the only skeptics.  Jack Marshall writes, “[W]hile some con-
sumers see benefit in tailored ads, most don’t want their information to be 
used to tailor them.”  He discussed a survey conducted by the market research 
company, Gfk, which found that of 1000 people surveyed, 49% agreed, “Ad-
vertising that is tailored to my needs is helpful because I can find the right 
products and services more quickly.”  Yet, the same survey found that only 
35% agreed that “I use free services online and on smartphones/tablets and 
don’t mind if my data is potentially also used for advertising purposes.”51 
A survey conducted in 2013 by Consumer Action, a non-profit consum-
er rights organization, supports such skepticism.  It found that 49% of all 
respondents falsely believe that online tracking is unlawful.52  Furthermore, 
69% of respondents would not be willing to allow companies to track, collect, 
 
 49. Poll: Internet Users Recognize the Importance of Online Advertising and the 
Value of Self-Regulation, DIGITAL ADVER. ALLIANCE (Nov. 5, 2013), 
http://www.aboutads.info/news. 
 50. For example, in response to the question – “Which, if any, of the following 
scenarios would make you more comfortable than you currently are with a company 
using information about your Web surfing interests to show you relevant ads?” – 27% 
of 1004 adults polled responded, “If all Web pages displaying these ads included a 
simple, easy-to-use opt-out option that lets me choose not to have my data used for 
advertising,” 16.3% responded, “If companies providing ads based on my interests 
were forbidden from collecting or using any sensitive financial or medical infor-
mation,” and 8.0% responded, “If companies providing ads based on my interests 
were required to participate in an enforcement program that could publicly sanction 
them if they did not meet their obligations.”  Public Opinion Poll, ZOGBY ANALYTICS 
(Oct. 2013), http://www.aboutads.info/ZogbyDAAOct13PollResults.pdf.  The re-
sponses do not indicate that respondents preferred self-regulation to government regu-
lation.  See id. 
 51. See Jack Marshall, Do Consumers Really Want Targeted Ads?, WALL ST. J. 
(Apr. 17, 2014, 12:30 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/cmo/2014/04/17/do-consumers-
really-want-targeted-ads/.  Marshall also cited another study conducted by Qriously, 
where only 48% of 4000 mobile device users responded that they preferred “targeted” 
ads over “non-targeted” ones.  Id.  (The question posed to the users was that given 
that ads “support your apps, which do you prefer?”). 
 52. Consumers to Online Advertisers: No Tracking for ANY Reason, CONSUMER 
ACTION (June 18, 2013), http://www.consumer-action.org/press/articles/no_tracking
_for_any_reason.  See also Consumer Action “Do Not Track” Survey Results, 
CONSUMER ACTION (2013) [hereinafter Survey Results], http://www.consumer-
action.org/downloads/english/Summary_DNT_survey.pdf. 
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and share data with permission in exchange for a free product or service.53  
Yet, most websites now track, collect, and share data without express permis-
sion or true consent.  In response to the statement, “You see no harm in being 
tracked online if it results in your being shown more relevant ads,” 55% 
“strongly disagree,” and 19% “somewhat disagree.”54  A majority (76%) 
strongly believes that there “should be a way for people to limit when they 
are tracked online.”55  An overwhelming majority (87%) believes that “you 
should have the right to control what information is collected about you 
online.”56 
More telling are survey results conducted from 1999 to 2012 by the An-
nenberg School for Communication.57  A survey conducted in 2003 found 
that: 
59% of adults who use the [I]nternet at home know that websites col-
lect information about them even if they don’t register. They do not, 
however, understand that data flows behind their screens invisibly 
connect seemingly unrelated bits about them.  When presented with a 
common version of the way sites track, extract, and share information 
to make money from advertising, 85% of adults who go online at 
home did not agree to accept it on even a valued site.58 
Other surveys suggest that Americans are becoming increasingly con-
cerned that companies are following their online movements.  In a 2005 
study, 81% disagreed with the statement that “what companies know about 
me won’t hurt me,” and 79% agreed that “I am nervous about websites hav-
ing information about me.”59  In 2009, researchers found that 66% of adult 
Americans do not want marketers to tailor advertisements.  This number was 
even greater – between 73% and 86% – when survey takers were informed of 
three common ways that marketers gather data to tailor ads.60  In sum, the 
common refrain of marketers – that consumers want tailored ads – finds no 
 
 53. Survey Results, supra note 52. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id.  Of the other responses, 14% “somewhat agree”; 3% “somewhat disa-
gree”, 6% “strongly disagree” and 1% “don’t know/no opinion.”  Id. 
 56. Id.  Of the other responses, 8% “somewhat agree,” 1% “somewhat disa-
gree,”4% “strongly disagree,” and 1% “don’t know/no opinion.”  Survey Results, 
supra note 52. 
 57. Joseph Turow et al., Americans, Marketers, and the Internet: 1999-2012, 
UNIV. OF PA. – ANNENBERG SCH. FOR COMMC’N (2014), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2423753. 
 58. Id. at 1–2 (citing Joseph Turow, Americans and Online Privacy: The System 
Is Broken 3, in Turow et al., supra note 57 [hereinafter Turow, Americans and Online 
Privacy]); see also Joseph Turow et al., The Federal Trade Commission and Consum-
er Privacy in the Coming Decade, 3 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y FOR THE INFO. SOC’Y 723, 732 
(2008). 
 59. Turow et al., supra note 57. 
 60. Id. 
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support in studies of consumer preferences.  Consumers may want more rele-
vant ads instead of irrelevant ads, but they do not want to lose control over 
their personal data in order to receive them. 
A recent survey conducted by the Pew Research Center found that 91% 
of adults surveyed “agree” or “strongly agree” that “consumers have lost con-
trol over how personal information is collected and used by companies,” and 
that 80% of those who use social networking sites are “concerned about third 
parties like advertisers or businesses accessing the data they share” on these 
sites.61 
In addition to being inaccurate, the claim that consumers like targeted 
advertising is misleading because consumers do not know the price they are 
paying for that service.  Companies do not collect data on their users solely to 
serve them with more relevant ads.  Some of these uses will eventually hurt at 
least some consumers, even those engaging in lawful behavior.  Companies 
combine and aggregate data in ways that may surprise consumers, and the 
result may harm some consumers, even if the harm is unintentional.62  Fur-
thermore, the more companies gather and store information, the greater the 
likelihood that the information will be used by third parties – known and un-
known to the primary website – in an unlawful or unethical manner. 
Language employed by websites in their wrap contracts suggests that 
data collection benefits customers.  For example, Twitter’s Privacy Policy 
states that it uses customer information “to display ads about things you may 
have already shown interest in.”63  Twitter presents this information as an 
example of why it may share information with third parties, but the Privacy 
Policy does not limit Twitter’s use of the data in any way.  Facebook’s data 
usage policy cited above claims that its data collection practices are intended 
“to provide you with location features and services, like telling you and your 
friends when something is going on nearby” and “to measure or understand 
the effectiveness of ads you and others see, including to deliver relevant ads 
to you.”64  But, as noted in the previous Part, the language is broadly worded, 
and the company’s ability to use the data collected is not limited to these spe-
cific examples. 
 
 61. Mary Madden, Public Perceptions of Privacy and Security in the Post-
Snowden Era, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/
2014/11/12/public-privacy-perceptions/.  See also FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX 
SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 19–58 
(2015) (explaining surprising ways that data is gathered and used and how it affects 
reputations). 
 62. See generally Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate 
Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2477899.  “Approached without care, data mining can reproduce 
existing patterns of discrimination, inherit the prejudice of prior decision-makers, or 
simply reflect the widespread biases that persist in society.”  Id. at 3. 
 63. Privacy Policy, TWITTER, https://twitter.com/privacy/ (last visited July 19, 
2015). 
 64. Id. 
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The real effect of such policies is to grant the websites broad rights to 
use and share user information.  The companies mislead consumers into be-
lieving that “targeted advertisements” are the only way the information can be 
used.  Most consumers do not understand what companies can do with their 
data, and the language of corporate “privacy” policies only misleads them.65  
Many never suspect their data is being used for purposes other than to process 
orders or create more relevant advertisements.  Or, at least they did not until 
Edward Snowden gave the public a peek into how much data companies col-
lect about us and what they do with it. 
C.  Does Data Mining Hurt Consumers? 
In her keynote address at the Computers Freedom and Privacy Confer-
ence, Commissioner Julie Brill of the Federal Trade Commission noted that 
Edward Snowden’s revelations: 
[G]ave the world a crash course in just how much privacy we can ex-
pect if we participate at all in an increasingly online and mobile mar-
ketplace. . . .  Americans are now more aware than ever of how much 
their personal data is free-floating in cyberspace, ripe for any data 
miner – government or otherwise – to collect, use, package and sell.66 
Snowden’s disclosures created headaches for the government. It also 
created headaches for the Internet giants that had lulled the public into believ-
ing that the data being collected was unidentifiable and limited to improving 
free services.  As Brill explained: 
We send our digital information out into cyberspace and get back ac-
cess to the magic of our wired lives.  We sense this, but it took Snow-
den to make concrete what exactly the exchange means – that firms or 
governments or individuals, without our knowledge or consent, and 
often in surprising ways, may amass private information about us to 
 
 65. Turow, Americans and Online Privacy, supra note 58, at 33.  Turow states: 
 
We found that despite their strong concerns about online privacy, most adults 
who use the [I]nternet at home misunderstand the purpose of a privacy policy.  
Just as important, our findings indicate that despite fairly wide awareness that 
websites collect information about them, adults who use the [I]nternet at home 
are fundamentally unaware of data flow: how organizations glean bits of 
knowledge about individuals online, interconnect those bits, link them to other 
sources of information, and share them with other organizations. 
 
Id. 
 66. Julie Brill, Comm’r, Keynote Address at the 23rd Computers Freedom and 
Privacy Conference, Washington, D.C. (June 26, 2013), https://www.ftc.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/reclaim-your-
name/130626computersfreedom.pdf. 
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use in a manner we don’t expect or understand and to which we have 
not explicitly agreed.67 
Corporations track and collect information about users online, and data 
brokers buy and sell that information to other companies.  These companies 
use the information to make decisions affecting all areas of consumer life. 
Companies have the ability to use surveillance for inappropriate dis-
crimination and manipulation.68  Companies may also start to use correlations 
to reach conclusions that are unfair or unsupportable.69  For example, a com-
pany may find a correlation between the number of pets a person owns and 
the number of times that person has been in a car accident and conclude that 
pet owners are at a higher (or lower) risk.  New banking start-up companies 
are using a variety of information from different sources to determine wheth-
er to make consumer loans, even though the validity of the correlations re-
mains unproven.70  One company even considers as relevant criteria the 
amount of time a potential borrower spends reading online terms and condi-
 
 67. Id. 
 68. See SCHNEIER, supra note 9, at 109–16 (discussing “weblining,” a twenty-
first century version of redlining, and technology that helps vendors price discrimi-
nate based on consumers past practices, as well as manipulation through product 
placement and advertisements and the more over Facebook mood manipulation 
study); see also PASQUALE, supra note 61, at 25–42 (explaining how “runaway data” 
is used to make assumptions regarding users’ health, income level, credit worthiness, 
race, sexual orientation and work habits). 
 69. After leading a review of Big Data and privacy requested by President 
Obama, John Podesta wrote that Big Data is making the economy work better and 
saves lives, yet it “raises serious questions,” including the “potential for big data ana-
lytics to lead to discriminatory outcomes and to circumvent longstanding civil rights 
protections in housing, employment, credit, and the consumer marketplace.”  John 
Podesta, Findings of the Big Data and Privacy Working Group Review, THE WHITE 
HOUSE BLOG (May 1, 2014, 1:15 PM EDT) https://www.whitehouse.gov/
blog/2014/05/01/findings-big-data-and-privacy-working-group-review.  See also Big 
Data: Seizing Opportunities, Preserving Values, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT 7 (May 2014) [hereinafter Big Data], https://www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/default/files/docs/big_data_privacy_report_may_1_2014.pdf; PASQUALE, supra 
note 61, at 38 (“Algorithms are not immune from the fundamental problem of dis-
crimination, in which negative and baseless assumptions congeal into prejudice. . . .  
And they must often use data laced with all-too-human prejudice.”); Amy J. Schmitz, 
Secret Consumer Scores and Segmentation: Separating “Haves” From “Have-Nots”, 
2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1141, 1141 (2014) (noting that consumers have no way to 
challenge the accuracy of collected data as it usually falls outside the reach of the Fair 
Credit Reporting Act and that it may “foster discrimination and augment preexisting 
power imbalances among consumers”). 
 70. Steve Lohr, Banking Start-Ups Adopt New Tools for Lending, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan 18, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/19/technology/banking-start-ups-
adopt-new-tools-for-lending.html?ref=technology (stating that the “technology is so 
new that the potential is unproved” and “raises questions, especially for regulators 
who enforce anti-discrimination laws”). 
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tions and whether he or she uses proper capitalization.71  While there are laws 
governing the use of some data in some areas, the ability for regulators to 
monitor and stop unlawful use is limited.72 
Furthermore, companies can use “surrogates” to gain access to data to 
which they do not have access.  For example, they may use a consumer’s 
occupation as an indicator of income level.73  Consumers may not know the 
reason why they were turned down for a job or denied a loan or insurance 
policy, and the reasons could be based on incorrect or outdated data.  Fur-
thermore, the statistical inferences might be discriminatory.74  The New York 
Public Interest Research Group found that some auto insurers were charging 
higher rates to drivers with less education and nonprofessional, nonmanageri-
al jobs.75  Already, at least one health care system is using credit card data to 
make predictions about patients’ health – and to take steps to deter what they 
consider to be unhealthy behavior.76  That company, which operates more 
than 900 care centers, purchases data from brokers who gather it from credit 
card purchases, store loyalty program transactions, and public records.  The 
company then uses this data to identify “high-risk patients” who may then be 
contacted by doctors and nurses who can reach out and suggest changes to 
their behaviors.77 
Data can also be used to help companies determine how much they can 
charge a particular customer or how much they can raise prices before an 
existing customer will leave for a competitor.  Some argue that using data to 
set prices may hurt lower-income consumers because they tend to comparison 
shop less than wealthier consumers.78  Facial recognition technology, com-
bined with data gathered from social networking sites and public records, 
may help nightclub owners decide who gets in based upon how much they are 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. Brill, supra note 66 (noting that while there are rules in place governing the 
way data can be used, many companies are unaware of these rules and “it is difficult 
to reach all of those who may be” engaging in unlawful data use activity). 
 73. Andy Morrison, a consumer advocate at the New York Public Interest Re-
search Group, believes that permissible questions such as occupation and education 
level are being used “as surrogates for income” in determining insurance premiums.  
Alina Tugend, As Data About Drivers Proliferates, Auto Insurers Look to Adjust 
Rates, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/19/your-
money/as-data-about-drivers-proliferates-auto-insurers-look-to-adjust-rates.html.  
California, however, does not permit the use of occupation or education level.  Id. 
 74. See Podesta, supra note 69 (raising concern about the “potential for big data 
analytics to lead to discriminatory outcomes and to circumvent longstanding civil 
rights protections in housing, employment, credit, and the consumer marketplace”). 
 75. Tugend, supra note 73. 
 76. Shannon Pettypiece & Jordan Robertson, Hospitals are Mining Patients’ 
Credit Card Data to Predict Who Will Get Sick, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (July 3, 
2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2014-07-03/hospitals-are-mining-
patients-credit-card-data-to-predict-who-will-get-sick. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
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likely to spend or encourage retailers to engage in preferential treatment of 
certain customers.79 
But data can also violate privacy in much more overt and irksome ways 
that might strike consumers as creepy or uncanny.  For example, The New 
York Times reported in 2012 that Target was tracking shoppers and looking 
for clues that they were pregnant.  The strategy was to target such women 
with advertising and to give Target a head start on other vendors seeking to 
lock in consumers developing new shopping patterns.80  This strategy can 
have explosive unintended consequences when, for example, the pregnancy 
has not yet been disclosed to family members who are then alerted to the 
situation when they notice the targeted ads. 
Data can also be used to help corporations better manipulate consumers.  
Their extensive dossier of consumer habits and preferences may enable com-
panies to better understand and exploit consumers.81 Ryan Calo argues that 
companies can use their intimate knowledge of the consumer to take ad-
vantage of consumers’ cognitive biases and “trigger irrationality or vulnera-
bility in consumers” that propel them to act in ways that may be harmful to 
their self-interest.82 The information that companies glean can be used to 
“generate a fastidious record” of consumer transactions and “personalize eve-
ry aspect of the interaction” with the marketplace.83 
It is undoubtedly true that data can be harnessed in socially beneficial 
ways.  Our purpose here is not to denounce “Big Data” or the use of data for 
research or policy purposes.  Our argument is much more narrowly focused: 
the problem is exploitation of customer data by private companies to further 
their corporate interest in profit maximization without effective disclosure 
and true consent of consumers. 
II.  PRIVATE DATA MINING AS AN EXERCISE OF QUASI-
GOVERNMENTAL POWER 
The preceding Part explained how data mining by private entities is as 
intrusive and objectionable as data mining by government entities such as the 
NSA.  In this Part, we contend that the Internet giants function as quasi-
 
 79. See Natasha Singer, When No One Is Just a Face in the Crowd, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 1, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/02/technology/when-no-one-is-just-
a-face-in-the-crowd.html?_r=0 (reporting on how facial recognition technology offers 
the ability to “surreptitiously offer some customers better treatment”). 
 80. See Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
16, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html?
pagewanted=all&_r=0 (“[T]he key is to reach them earlier, before any other retailers 
know a baby is on the way.”). 
 81. Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 999 
(2014) (“[T]he digitization of commerce dramatically alters the capacity of firms to 
influence consumers at a personal level.”). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 1002–03. 
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governmental agencies by implementing governance systems and rules to 
regulate the conduct of their users.84  Yet, unlike the government, they are not 
subject to constitutional limitations or democratic controls. 
Private companies can exercise their power over users in two ways: 
through the exercise of their property rights and through contract.  Contract 
allows private companies to obtain rights they would not otherwise have 
through mere property ownership.  Using contractual means, companies can 
establish and enforce their own laws, rules, and regulations, just as the gov-
ernment does. 
The Internet giants are private entities that, as proprietors, may exercise 
certain rights over users. They expand those default proprietorship rights and 
obtain additional rights through their use of contracts.  These contracts im-
pose rules and regulations upon users, and allow companies to exercise legis-
lative and administrative authority akin to that of the government.  As Marga-
ret Jane Radin has written,85 private agreements have the ability to undo, for 
example, consumer protection legislation and the class action mechanism.  
The myth of consumer consent permits such companies to eliminate terms 
that might favor consumers in litigation against the Internet giants.  The legis-
lative role that private companies play by using these so-called contracts thus 
undermines many of the fruits of our democratic political process, resulting in 
what Radin called “democratic degradation.”86 
The Internet giants also enjoy the benefits of specialized legislation, 
such as Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), which 
offers them immunities from certain tort liability similar to those enjoyed by 
the government, and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act reforms that 
immunize them from breach of contract claims when they share information 
with the government in violation of privacy provisions in their agreements 
with customers.87  As a result, these companies are subject to neither the bur-
den of transparency nor the constitutional constraints imposed upon state 
actors; yet they often escape governmental regulation.  They benefit from 
immunity from tort liability in a way that mimics governmental immunity.  
Unlike the government, however, they are not obligated to act in the public 
interest, and, unlike elected officials, they are not subject to democratic pro-
cesses. 
 
 84. As David S. Evans notes, these governance systems may be socially benefi-
cial.  See David S. Evans, Governing Bad Behavior By Users of Multi-Sided Plat-
forms, 27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1201 (2012). 
 85. MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, 
AND THE RULE OF LAW (2012). 
 86. Id. at 16. 
 87. See H.R. 3321, 110th Cong. § 5(a) (2007); Federal Intelligence Surveillance 
Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, §§ 702(h)(3), 703(e), 
122 Stat. 2436 (2008) (providing that no action may be maintained in any court 
against a company sharing information with the government in connection with na-
tional security investigations). 
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Finally, we note that while private entities enjoy extraordinary powers 
as quasi-governmental agencies, they also simultaneously assert their rights 
as private persons.  They are emboldened to do so more aggressively in the 
aftermath of recent Supreme Court decisions adopting an expansive interpre-
tation of corporate personhood.88   
A.  Privatization of Laws, Rules, and Regulations 
The networks of Internet giants are private, not public, which gives them 
the power to impose certain rules upon users.  Their ownership of property – 
their property being their domain names, their networks, and their business 
models – grants them certain rights.  These rights, in turn, operate as a de 
facto regulatory regime.  As David Evans explains: 
Multi-sided platforms . . . develop governance systems to reduce . . . 
bad behavior and minimize negative externalities. . . .  These plat-
forms enforce such rules by exercising their property rights to exclude 
users from the platform.  In some cases, the rules and penalties im-
posed by the platform are similar to, and in some cases close substi-
tutes for, rules and penalties adopted by a public regulator.89 
Internet giants create virtual spaces that consumers inhabit.  When con-
sumers do so, they enter a world in which private companies are both service 
providers and regulatory bodies that govern their own and their users’ con-
duct. 
These regulatory regimes often serve to create a certain community and 
to establish norms of acceptable conduct.  Facebook, for example, has a Code 
of Conduct that specifies what behavior is prohibited on the site.  Such gov-
ernance systems provide for penalties and punishment for misbehavior, in-
cluding banishment from the site.  The companies have the right to impose 
certain rules as a condition to entry because they own the property of the 
website.  Codes of Conduct are not unique to the online environment.  A 
shopping center, for example, may prohibit certain animals, unruly behavior, 
or even some otherwise protected activities on the premises.90   These rules 
 
 88. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768–75 (2014) 
(interpreting the term “person” in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act as protect-
ing the religious liberty interests of for-profit corporations); Citizens United v. FEC, 
558 U.S. 310 (2010) (recognizing the free speech rights of corporate entities). 
 89. Evans, supra note 84, at 1204.  A “multi-sided platform” brings together 
“two or more different types of users, who could benefit from getting together, find 
and interact with each other, and exchange value.”  Id. at 1203.  Examples of multi-
sided platforms include software platforms, search engines, and social networks.  Id. 
 90. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520–21 (1976) (upholding the right of 
a mall owner to prevent workers from advertising their labor strike); Lloyd Corp. v. 
Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 570 (1972) (upholding the right of a mall owner to exclude 
Vietnam war protestors from its premises). 
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do not require consent, provided that the only penalty imposed for disobeying 
them is ejection from the premises.  Notice provides a semblance of fairness 
and minimizes resistance to ejection, but notice is not required for ejection in 
most cases.91   The right to eject someone from purely private property arises 
from the bundle of rights belonging to a property owner.  But wrap contracts 
can also give rise to property rights.92 
A contract legitimizes the reallocation of rights from one party to anoth-
er.  For example, a property owner has no right to extract money from a tres-
passer on its premises – it may only eject the trespasser.93  Allowing the 
property owner to arbitrarily establish the fee for the trespass accords the 
property owner too much power.  The owner may, however, charge money 
for entry.  Notice provides the visitor with the opportunity to participate in 
the process – even if he does not set the fee for entry, he can reject the fee by 
refusing to pay it in exchange for entering the premises.  But in order for the 
notice to rise to the level of contract, there needs to be consent.  In other 
words, the user must have seen or should have seen the notice – what courts 
refer to as actual or constructive notice – regarding the fee before it can be 
enforced.94 
The online environment is different from the physical one, however, in 
the way that it has expanded the role of the Code of Conduct.  Online Codes 
of Conduct are much lengthier, encompass more activities, impose unex-
pected burdens, and extract rights that offline Codes of Conducts do not.  
Website Codes of Conduct typically impose rules or obligations that carry 
penalties other than ejection.  In such cases, the website proprietors seek to 
exercise rights that they do not already possess or that are unallocated.95  This 
is often the case where technology creates business opportunities in grey are-
as of the law.  Businesses seek to use technological advances to their ad-
vantage. 
Internet-based companies, more so than traditional physical-world cor-
porations, have a reputation for risk-taking, moving quickly, and worrying 
about the consequences later.  Facebook’s motto, “Move fast and break 
 
 91. See Richard M. Hynes, Posted: Notice and the Right to Exclude, 45 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 949, 958 (2013) (observing that the default U.S. rule is that notice is satisfied so 
long as the boundaries of the property are posted). 
 92. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 
(1982) (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)) (character-
izing the right to exclude as “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights 
that are commonly characterized as property”). 
 93. KIM, supra note 27, at 135–36.  We refer here only to the common law and 
not specific local legislation, which may differ. 
 94. Id. at 136–37. 
 95. For further discussion on the various functions of notice and consent with 
respect to particular rights, see id. at 93–109; Nancy S. Kim, Boilerplate and Consent, 
17 GREEN BAG 2d 293, 301–05 (2014). 
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things,” reflects this ethos.96  Companies like Facebook and Google are proud 
of their “hacker culture,”97 their willingness to take risks and fail,98 and their 
desire to challenge the status quo.  In this business environment, many asso-
ciate risk-taking with innovation, and deliberateness and prudence are associ-
ated with stagnation and true failure.  In a letter to investors before Facebook 
went public, Mark Zuckerberg wrote: 
Building great things means taking risks.  This can be scary and pre-
vents most companies from doing the bold things they should.  How-
ever, in a world that’s changing so quickly, you’re guaranteed to fail if 
you don’t take any risks.  We have another saying: “The riskiest thing 
is to take no risks.”  We encourage everyone to make bold decisions, 
even if that means being wrong some of the time.99 
Not surprisingly, these risk-taking, fast-moving young companies are 
eager to deploy new technologies that are not only novel, but also raise ethi-
cal, moral, or legal concerns.100 Courts and legislatures, responsive by nature, 
are several steps behind, leaving businesses to operate in a legal gap without 
the benefit of case precedent or legislation to guide them.  Operating in un-
chartered territory, Internet giants seek to minimize the risk to themselves of 
their risky behavior both by containing their liability through contract and by 
cultivating favorable public opinion. 
In the gap created where technology moves ahead of the law, there are 
uncertainties regarding whether certain practices infringe upon the rights of 
others.  Data-collection practices are the most glaring example.  Businesses 
can use contracts to operate in this legal gap.  Contracts permit companies to 
allocate unallocated rights and otherwise minimize their legal exposure.  As 
discussed in Part II.A., however, it is doubtful that users actually consent to 
the data collection practices of these companies. 
 
 96. See Mark Zuckerberg’s Letter to Investors: ‘The Hacker Way’, WIRED (Feb. 
1, 2012, 6:35 PM) http://www.wired.com/2012/02/zuck-letter/. 
 97. Mark Zuckerberg, the CEO and founder of Facebook, described the company 
as having cultivated a culture and management approach that he referred to as the 
“Hacker Way.”  Id.  He described hacking as “building something quickly or testing 
the boundaries of what can be done.”  Id. 
 98. Google’s chief social evangelist, Gopi Kallayil, lists as one of Google’s rules 
of innovative culture, the ability to “fail well.”  Kathy Chin Leong, Google Reveals 
Its 9 Principles of Innovation, FAST CO., http://www.fastcompany.com/3021956/how-
to-be-a-success-at-everything/googles-nine-principles-of-innovation (last visited July 
3, 2015) (“There should be no stigma attached to failure.  If you do not fail often, you 
are not trying hard enough.”). 
 99. Mark Zuckerberg’s Letter to Investors: ‘The Hacker Way’, supra note 96. 
 100. It is important to point out that innovation is not the exclusive domain of 
young Internet companies.  “Innovate or die” is a slogan that could apply to any busi-
ness, and we view the association of Internet giants with a special type of bold, entre-
preneurial risk taking as another example of the self-interested rhetoric that Internet 
giants employ to enhance their ability to evade regulation. 
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To a large extent, Internet giants have been successful at staving off 
regulation by lobbying for self-regulation,101 although their efforts have been 
– unsurprisingly – a failure in protecting consumer privacy.102  In a report, the 
Electronic Privacy Information Center, a non-profit research center, warned 
that “[s]elf-regulatory systems have served to stall Congress while anesthetiz-
ing the public to increasingly invasive business practices.”103 
But Internet giants do not merely evade regulation; they seek to own it, 
and in this way they take on governmental regulatory functions.  To illustrate 
this, we return to the example of Facebook’s experimentation on its users.  As 
a general rule, an Institutional Review Board (“IRB”) must approve any ex-
perimentation involving human subjects.104  The federal government estab-
lished IRBs through the 1974 National Research Act, which applies to any 
research institution that utilizes federal funding.105  Because Facebook is a 
private company not reliant on federal assistance, no IRB approved its user 
study.106 
 
 101. For example, in response to pending “do-not-track” legislation in California, 
several technology companies, including Google and Facebook, sent a letter warning 
of dire consequences to Internet commerce and the economy of the state of California.  
Letter from California business to Alan Lowenthal, Cal. State Senator (Apr. 27, 
2011), http://cdn.arstechnica.net/oppositionletter.pdf; see also Matthew Lasar, 
Google, Facebook: “Do Not Track” Bill a Threat to California Economy, 
ARSTECHNICA (May 6, 2011, 11:02 AM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2011/05/google-facebook-fight-california-do-not-track-law/.  The California 
legislature recently approved a “do-not-track” disclosure law instead.  See Vindu 
Goel, California Urges Websites to Disclose Online Tracking, N.Y. TIMES (May 21, 
2014), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/05/21/california-urges-websites-to-
disclose-online-tracking/?_php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0. 
 102. See Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Privacy Self Regulation: A Decade of Disappoint-
ment, ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR. (Mar. 4, 2005), https://epic.org/reports/ decadedis-
appoint.html (finding that technologies have become more intrusive and that the FTC 
should abandon its faith in self-regulation). 
 103. Id. at 15. 
 104. See National Research Act, Pub. L. No. 93-348, 88 Stat. 342, § 474(a) (1974) 
(calling for the establishment of IRBs “to review biomedical and behavioral research 
involving human subjects . . . in order to protect the rights of the human subjects of 
such research”). 
 105. See id. (making the Act applicable only to institutions that seek a grant or 
contract from the federal government). 
 106. Compare Adrienne LaFrance, Even the Editor of Facebook’s Mood Study 
Thought It Was Creepy, THE ATL. (June 28, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.
com/technology/archive/2014/06/even-the-editor-of-facebooks-mood-study-thought-
it-was-creepy/373649/ (suggesting that Cornell University had “pre-approved” the 
study because it was based on a pre-existing database), with Gail Sullivan, Cornell 
Ethics Board Did Not Pre-Approve Facebook Mood Manipulation Study, WASH. 
POST (July 1, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/
07/01/facebooks-emotional-manipulation-study-was-even-worse-than-you-thought/ 
(citing a Cornell statement that Cornell had not thought IRB review was required and 
thus did not review the Facebook study). 
750 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
In undertaking its mood experiment, Facebook collaborated with two 
communications and information scientists at Cornell University.107  Cornell 
decided that because the work of its researchers involved only data analysis 
and no actual interaction with human subjects, IRB review was not neces-
sary.108  The result was a public relations disaster for Facebook and, accord-
ing to The New York Times, for the Cornell researchers, who were accused of 
engaging in “mind control.”109 
One might think that the solution ought to be some sort of government-
mandated regulation, but as they have in the area of privacy, Facebook and 
other industry giants aim to “self-regulate,” thereby co-opting the regulatory 
function.110  They seek to establish the terms under which they will continue 
to experiment on their customers, resisting an outside ethical review process 
that they believe would impede their ability to innovate.111  Cornell’s Profes-
sor Jeffrey Hancock has said that he and the others involved in the Facebook 
emotions experiment “didn’t realize that manipulating the news feed, even 
modestly, would make some people feel violated.”112  His response is un-
doubtedly sincere.  Yet, this failure to anticipate the reactions of Facebook’s 
users is a compelling reason to have unaffiliated third parties, with expertise 
in ethics, involved in the review process. 
B.  Rights Deletion with a Click 
Internet giants use wrap contracts to reorder or delete rights otherwise 
available to consumers.  These rights may include substantive limitations on 
remedial rights, or they may involve procedural mechanisms, such as class 
action waivers, that render contractual remedies, and even statutory remedial 
schemes, unobtainable.  They also include the deletion of other rights, such as 
 
 107. See Vindu Goel, As Data Overflows Online, Researchers Grapple with Eth-
ics, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2014) [hereinafter Goel, As Data Overflows Online], 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/13/technology/the-boon-of-online-data-puts-social-
science-in-a-quandary.html?ref=technology&_r=1  (stating that the Facebook emo-
tion experiment was “designed and analyzed with help from Professor Hancock and 
another academic researcher, Jamie E. Guillory”). 
 108. Sullivan, supra note 106 (“Cornell University’s Institutional Review Board 
concluded that [Cornell researchers were] not directly engaged in human research and 
that no review by the Cornell Human Research Protection Program was required.”). 
 109. See Goel, As Data Overflows Online, supra note 107 (quoting from one of 
the “hundreds of anguished and angry e-mails” Professor Hancock received). 
 110. See id. (describing the efforts of academics, such as Professor Hancock, and 
corporate entities, such as Microsoft Research, to develop their own ethical guide-
lines). 
 111. See id. (paraphrasing Professor Hancock as expressing the view that 
“[c]ompanies won’t willingly participate in anything that limits their ability to inno-
vate quickly”). 
 112. Id. 
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speech, privacy, and intellectual property rights unrelated to a business’s po-
tential liability. 
As Margaret Jane Radin has explained, businesses use form contracts to 
overrule legislation specifically designed to protect parties to form contracts, 
including consumers, small businesses, and employees.113  Not all form con-
tracts are alike.114  Form contracting reduces transaction costs.115 It can be 
useful for frequently repeated transactions or for repeat players who are fa-
miliar with the standard terms and who possess relatively equal bargaining 
power.116  Such parties are always free to begin with a standard form agree-
ment and to subject the form to revision through negotiation.  Even where 
standard form agreements are not subject to revision, they are acceptable if 
they contain terms reasonable to both parties. 
But in this Part, we are focused on the spectrum of contracts that Marga-
ret Jane Radin calls “World B” contracts – that is, adhesive form contracts 
that courts may well enforce even though consumers have never given mean-
ingful consent to their terms.117  Radin contrasts World B contracts with 
“World A contracts that involve actual agreement on salient terms.”118  Radin 
has coined the term “mass-market boilerplate rights-deletion schemes” to 
describe the use of boilerplate contract language to divest recipients of their 
rights.119 
1.  Limiting Remedies and the Role of the Judiciary Through        
Boilerplate 
Boilerplate documents protect their creators against liability.  This is so 
even though the rights deleted in boilerplate agreements have been enacted 
 
 113. See RADIN, supra note 85, at 16 (introducing the concept of “democratic 
degradation,” whereby contracts “delete rights that are granted through the democrat-
ic process” and substitute a system imposed by the business that drafts the form con-
tract). 
 114. See id. at 33 (recognizing the distinction between standard form contracts 
and “mass-market boilerplate rights deletion schemes”).  Even within boilerplate 
contracts, Radin provides a useful typology, including standardized adhesion con-
tracts, offsite terms, shrink-wrap licenses, and rolling contracts.  Id. at 10–11.  See 
also KIM, supra note 27, at 53–62 (noting that while wrap contracts have a lot in 
common with other contracts of adhesion, their form raises peculiar difficulties). 
 115. See, e.g., Nw. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916 F.2d 372, 377 (7th Cir. 
1990) (noting that form contracts reduce transactions costs); KIM, supra note 27, at 27 
(noting that courts often uphold form contracts, even in the absence of clear indicia of 
assent because they regard form contracts as efficient and as facilitating transactions). 
 116. See Mark Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 465 (2006) (noting 
that standard form contracts can serve useful purposes in “mass-market, repeat-play 
settings”). 
 117. See RADIN, supra note 85, at 8–9 (describing the “purported contracts” of 
World B). 
 118. See id. at 3. 
 119. See id. at 33. 
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through democratic political processes that one might think would trump such 
private legislation. 
Theoretically, courts may strike down World B contracts as illusory or 
unconscionable.120  That is cold comfort, however, in large part because of 
what Radin terms “democratic degradation.”121  Numerous legal mechanisms 
in World B transactions, such as forum selection clauses, arbitration clauses, 
class action waivers, disclaimers of consequential damages, and limitations of 
liability prevent such transactions from being subject to effective legal chal-
lenges.122  These characteristics of World B contracts degrade democracy 
because they permit private actors to dictate contractual terms that undermine 
regulatory and remedial schemes that are the product of democratic process-
es.  So, for example, the Supreme Court has allowed arbitration provisions, 
including class action waivers, to trump state legislation that prohibits such 
waivers with respect to claims arising under state law.123 
In the recent Italian Colors case,124 the Supreme Court granted Ameri-
can Express’s motion to compel arbitration of plaintiffs’ antitrust claims – 
despite the fact that plaintiffs would be unable to pursue their claims in arbi-
tration on a class basis.  The expense involved in bringing an antitrust claim 
effectively deprived plaintiffs of a meaningful remedy because they could not 
pursue their claims through a class action.  As Justice Kagan summarized in 
her dissent: 
[I]f the arbitration clause is enforceable, Amex has insulated itself 
from antitrust liability – even if it has in fact violated the law. The 
monopolist gets to use its monopoly power to insist on a contract ef-
fectively depriving its victims of all legal recourse. 
And here is the nutshell version of today’s opinion, admirably flaunted 
rather than camouflaged: Too darn bad.125 
In Justice Kagan’s view, the Supreme Court, by ruling in Amex’s favor 
in this case, permits private legislation in the form of non-consensual, World 
 
 120. Steven W. Feldman, Mutual Assent, Normative Degradation, and Mass Mar-
ket Standard Form Contracts – A Two-Part Critique of Boilerplate: The Fine Print, 
Vanishing Rights and the Rule of Law (Part I), 62 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 373, 425–29 
(2014) (reviewing case law on unconscionability and concluding that the doctrine “is 
frequently an effective tool to ready merchant overreaching on mass market boiler-
plate agreements”). 
 121. RADIN, supra note 85, at 33–51. 
 122. See id. at 33–42 (describing the way in which “copycat boilerplate” effec-
tively eliminates all consumer choice and forces all purchasers to forfeit rights won 
through democratic process). 
 123. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 124. Am. Express Co. v. It. Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
 125. Id. at 2313 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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B, mass boilerplate, rights-deletion schemes, to trump federal antitrust legis-
lation. 
Similarly, Internet giants use contracts to insulate themselves from legal 
claims that derive from consumer protection legislation that was often dec-
ades in the making.  Untold hours of toil in the realm of public policy advo-
cacy are undone with the stroke of a pen, or more likely, with a reflexive and 
unreflective click on an “I agree” icon. 
2.  Deleting Rights Through Opaque Bargains and Monopoly Power 
The previous Part explained how Internet giants use wrap contracts to 
delete consumers’ rights to redress grievances.  Businesses use these provi-
sions to limit their potential liability and assess their risk exposure.  There are 
other provisions, however, that have nothing to do with limiting a business’s 
liability.  Instead, these provisions claim rights in a way that lacks transpar-
ency and may substantially alter or diminish the value of the bargain for the 
consumer.126  A company may, for example, use non-disparagement clauses 
to limit the user’s right to speak.127 
The distributive reach of Internet giants and the private nature of the In-
ternet mean that business decisions made by them may have an indirect effect 
on basic social, economic, and even civil rights.  Facebook, for example, 
dominates the marketplace in the area of social networking.  Given the way 
social networks operate, being banished from Facebook means being shut out 
of the biggest online community in the world.  Google is the dominant search 
engine, which means that its decision to remove content or even change its 
algorithm affects one’s ability to attract readers to the content one displays on 
 
 126. Nancy Kim has referred to this type of provision as a “crook” provision 
elsewhere.  See KIM, supra note 27, at 44–52. 
 127. One reportedly threatened to charge a $250 penalty if a customer even 
threatened to complain or seek a credit card chargeback.  Chris Morran, Online Re-
tailer Will Fine You $250 if You Even Threaten to Complain About Purchase, 
CONSUMERIST (Aug. 27, 2014), http://consumerist.com/2014/08/27/online-retailer-
will-fine-you-250-if-you-even-threaten-to-complain-about-purchase/.  This apparently 
was no empty threat.  Id.  One consumer sued the company, Accessory Outlet, after it 
charged her the $250 penalty.  Id.  She requested a chargeback from her credit card 
company for a product that she claimed was not shipped.  Id.  Accessory Outlet alleg-
edly told her that the claim would be sent to a collections agency where it would “put 
a negative mark” on her credit and result in “calls to your home and or/work.”  Id.  
She alleged that the company also threatened that she would be charged for additional 
fees for any correspondence that the company had with plaintiff’s card issuer.  Id.  
The California legislature recently passed a law prohibiting non-disparagement claus-
es in consumer contracts.  CAL. CIVIL CODE § 1670.8 (West 2015) (effective Jan. 1, 
2015). 
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a website.128  As a practical matter, the content might as well not be there if it 
cannot be found through Google’s search function. 
The business practices of Internet giants set online standards, restrict or 
delete consumers’ rights, establish business norms, and dictate behavior that 
shapes and affects the lives of citizens.  As the next Part explains, the power 
of Internet giants to control society is, in some ways, even greater than that of 
the government. 
C.  Governmental Power Without Accountability 
Despite the enormous power wielded by Internet giants, their status as 
private actors frees them from the constraints that limit state actors.  While 
Snowden’s disclosures prompted a fierce public outcry that continues to re-
verberate, the outcry was directed primarily at the government.129 
For example, David Schneier begins his book, Data and Goliath, by 
noting that one might consider the typical cell phone contract as an implicit 
bargain.  The user gets to make and receive calls; in return, the company 
knows where the user is at all times.130  Schneier concedes that one might 
consider this a good deal, even though the surveillance by private companies 
is extensive.  It is only when Schneier links private surveillance to govern-
ment surveillance that he introduces terms like “intimidation,” “social con-
trol,” “Orwellian,” and “totalitarian.”131 
However, unlike private actors, the government’s power is constrained 
by the Constitution and the balance of powers.  For example, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently held that a provision of the USA 
Patriot Act, allowing the systematic collection of phone records in bulk, is 
illegal because it exceeds the scope of Congress’s power.132  This Part dis-
cusses how private entities have more power in certain ways than the gov-
ernment to limit citizens’ speech, arbitrarily deprive citizens of property, and 
subject citizens to unreasonable searches and seizures. 
 
 128. See generally Allyson Haynes Stuart, Google Search Results: Buried If Not 
Forgotten (Oct. 21, 2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2343398. 
 129. See, e.g., Editorial, President Obama’s Dragnet, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/07/opinion/president-obamas-
dragnet.html?ref=opinion&_r=0 (claiming that the Obama administration was abus-
ing its power and had lost all credibility when it came to transparency and accounta-
bility); Editorial, Massive Secret Surveillance Betrays Americans: Our View, USA 
TODAY (June 6, 2013), http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/06/06/nsa-
phone-records-verizon-internet-editorials-debates/2398819/ (calling NSA surveillance 
outrageous). 
 130. SCHNEIER, supra note 9, at 1. 
 131. Id. at 2. 
 132. ACLU v. Clapper, No. 14-42-CV, 2015 WL 2097814, at 1* (2d Cir. May 7, 
2015). 
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1.  Speech Restrictions and the Private Regulatory Nature of the     
Internet 
The government may not pass laws abridging the freedom of speech.133  
Private companies, however, may enter into contracts where individuals agree 
to limit their ability to speak freely.  Courts routinely uphold non-disclosure 
and non-disparagement clauses in employment, confidentiality, and other 
negotiated agreements.  Speech-restricting clauses in non-negotiated agree-
ments, however, raise serious questions of consent and fairness.  As discussed 
in Part II.A., courts have routinely upheld wrap contracting forms under theo-
ries of constructive assent and constructive notice even where users lacked 
actual notice and failed to actually assent to terms.  Courts might refuse to 
enforce non-disparagement clauses that impose penalties on the grounds of 
unconscionability.  However, they may never have the opportunity to do so 
given that many wrap contracts containing such provisions also contain bind-
ing mandatory arbitration clauses.  Thus, it would be left to an arbitrator to 
determine whether such a clause would be unconscionable.  Because arbitra-
tion decisions are not part of public record, there would be neither precedent 
to inform the future behavior of businesses or consumers nor opportunity to 
appeal decisions, which would essentially erode the common law.134  Fur-
thermore, most consumers would likely not risk challenging the enforceabil-
ity of a penalty-imposing non-disparagement clause.  Instead, they would 
likely abide by the clause to avoid legal fees, the imposition of fines, and/or 
damage to their credit. 
Non-disparagement clauses are not the only mechanism by which online 
companies may restrict users’ speech.  They can also enforce Codes of Con-
duct that restrict certain language.  While Codes of Conduct are typically 
used to enforce norms of civility,135 they may also stifle speech that expresses 
political views or perspectives that would be constitutionally protected.  In-
ternet companies also establish policies that stifle speech.  For example, en-
forcing its “real names” policy, Facebook shut down the accounts of mem-
bers of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender community who used 
 
 133. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to peti-
tion the Government for a redress of grievances.”). 
 134. See RADIN, supra note 85, at 134 (contending that firms include mandatory 
arbitration provisions in their contracts because “arbitration has no precedential val-
ue” and “leaves no written public record”). 
 135. The use of Codes of Conduct to enforce civility norms should be condoned.  
Our concern here is that companies have discretion to regulate speech without over-
sight.  Furthermore, the lack of transparency and the arbitrariness of decisions raise 
due process concerns.  See discussion infra Part III.C.1.a–b. 
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pseudonyms for a variety of reasons, including protecting themselves from 
harassment for their personal expression and political views.136 
The power of private companies to control speech through the exercise 
of their proprietorship rights poses serious consequences online because of 
the private nature of the Internet.  As Dawn Nunziato has explained, the “vast 
majority of speech on the Internet today occurs within private places and 
spaces that are owned and regulated by private entities.”137  Consequently, as 
Jack Balkin has noted, censorship “is as likely to come from private entities 
that control telecommunications networks and online services as from the 
government.”138 
The constitutional protections afforded by the First Amendment for free 
speech only apply to state actors.139  Internet giants establish their own “free 
speech” rules in their TOS or Acceptance Use Policies.  As Marvin Ammuri 
writes, lawyers who work for the Internet giants “effectively engage in pri-
vate speech rulemaking, adjudication, and enforcement”140 when they draft 
and implement these policies and the procedures to enforce them.  The law-
making power of lawyers and others who institute and implement the content 
policies at the Internet giants’ direction has prompted Jeffrey Rosen to com-
ment that these individuals wield “more power . . . than any president or 
judge.”141 
 
 136. James Nichols, Facebook “Name Change” Policy Disproportionately Affect-
ing LGBT Community, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 15, 2014), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/15/facebook-name-change_n_5824836.html; 
Valeriya Safronova, Drag Performers Fight Facebook’s “Real Name” Policy, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/25/fashion/drag-
performers-fight-facebooks-real-name-policy.html?_r=0. 
 137. Dawn C. Nunziato, The Death of the Public Forum in Cyberspace, 20 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1115 passim (2005). 
 138. Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age, 36 PEPP. L. 
REV. 427, 437 (2009).  See also Stuart, supra note 128, at 30 (“Many have accused 
Google of hand-editing its own search results in order to punish behavior it views as 
violating its Terms of Service.”). 
 139. Balkin, supra note 138, at 429.  See also Marjorie Heins, The Brave New 
World of Social Media Censorship, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 325, 326 (2014) (noting 
that most of what Facebook proscribes in its Statement of Rights and Responsibilities 
is protected by the First Amendment and its internal appeals process is “mysterious at 
best”). 
 140. Marvin Ammori, The “New” New York Times: Free Speech Lawyering in 
the Age of Google and Twitter, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2259, 2273 (2014). 
 141. Jeffrey Rosen, The Delete Squad: Google, Twitter, Facebook and the New 
Global Battle Over the Future of Free Speech, NEW REP. (Apr. 29, 2013), 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/113045/free-speech-internet-silicon-valley-
making-rules.  Rosen refers to these individuals as the “Deciders.”  Id.  He writes that 
“[a]s corporate rather than government actors, the Deciders aren’t formally bound by 
the First Amendment.”  Id.  Marvin Ammori notes that “some of the most important 
First Amendment lawyering today is happening at top technology companies.”  Am-
mori, supra note 140, at 2262. 
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a.  How Section 230 of the CDA Diminishes Users’ Ability to Control Speech 
The ability of private companies to impose greater restrictions on speech 
than state actors may be beneficial in establishing and enforcing civil behav-
ior.  Yet, websites are not required to enforce any civility norms at all.  On 
the contrary, under judicial interpretation of Section 230 of the CDA, web-
sites are expressly protected from liability for content posted by third parties.  
Section 230 provides the Internet giants with blanket immunity from civil 
liability for any choice they may make about the regulation or non-regulation 
of speech on multi-sided platforms, or what the CDA terms “interactive com-
puter services.”142  Section 230 provides: 
(c) Protection for “Good Samaritan” blocking and screening of offen-
sive material 
(1) Treatment of publisher or speaker 
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be 
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by 
another information content provider. 
(2) Civil liability 
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be 
held liable on account of – 
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict 
access to or availability of material that the provider or 
user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, 
excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectiona-
ble, whether or not such material is constitutionally pro-
tected; or 
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to in-
formation content providers or others the technical 
 
 142. The CDA defines “interactive computer service” as “any information service, 
system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by mul-
tiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that pro-
vides access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries 
or educational institutions.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) (2012).  The term has been inter-
preted broadly to include all websites and online services.  See generally Joel R. 
Reidenberg et al., Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act: A Survey of the 
Legal Literature and Reform Proposals 2, FORDHAM CTR. ON L. & INFO. POL’Y AT 
FORDHAM LAW SCH. (Apr. 25, 2012), http://law.fordham.edu/assets/CLIP/Fordham_
CLIP_CDA_230_Report_4-25-12.pdf. 
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means to restrict access to material described in para-
graph (1).143 
Other provisions of the CDA make clear that the immunity covers 
claims that might be made against Internet giants or other providers of inter-
active services under state or local laws.144 
The power to control users’ speech and the freedom from responsibility 
for such speech puts users in a precarious situation with respect to liability for 
what they say online.  The Internet has spawned a norm of impulsivity where 
users post without carefully considering the consequences.  A user may post a 
false or defamatory comment or review while in an emotionally-inflamed 
state.  Because the poster is often anonymous, the subject of a harmful or 
false post often has no recourse but to appeal to the website to remove it.  A 
website, however, has no obligation to remove such a posting, even if the 
poster himself requests its removal.  Due to Section 230 immunity, the web-
site may have no incentive to remove even defamatory content.  The poster, 
however, is not immune from liability.145  As a result, the website is in the 
mighty position of having the power to control the continued publication of 
the speech without having any of the responsibility for it. 
b.  Speech Restrictions and Non-Disparagement Clauses 
Even users posting truthful or non-defamatory content may wish to re-
move a negative review.  For example, in one case, a couple attempted to 
have their negative review removed after being threatened by a company that 
claimed the couple had violated its TOS by doing so.146  The website where 
they posted the review, Ripoff Reports, refused to allow them to do so unless 
the couple first went through the website’s arbitration process.147  The arbitra-
tion process, however, would have cost $2000.148  While one might argue that 
a website’s refusal to remove reviews even upon request of the poster pro-
tects truthful reviews from being removed by businesses, it takes the decision 
out of the hands of the original poster and places it into the hands of the web-
site, which is immune from tort liability for the post.  It also creates a moral 
hazard where the website hosting the post may benefit from a defamatory 
post.  Such a post may increase traffic to the site or, as in the case of Ripoff 
 
 143. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c). 
 144. See id. § 230(e)(3) (“No cause of action may be brought and no liability may 
be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.”). 
 145. See Nancy S. Kim, Website Design and Liability, 52 JURIMETRICS 383 
(2012) (explaining how courts have interpreted section 230 to provide websites with 
broad immunity which creates more potential harm for both victims and posters). 
 146. Pamela Brown, Couple Fined for Negative Online Review, CNN (Dec. 26, 
2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/02/tech/couple-fined-for-negative-review/
index.html. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
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Report, the company may be able to force a regretful poster into paying man-
datory arbitration fees or other fees as a condition to removing the post. 
2.  Deprivation of Personal Property Without Due Process 
The Constitution protects citizens against the deprivation of property 
without due process.149  The government could not deprive citizens of the use 
of their cars or homes, for example, without due process.  Internet giants, 
however, are freed from any such constitutional constraints.  Consumers en-
trust companies like Yahoo, Facebook, and Google with their private corre-
spondence, photos, music, and contact lists.  These companies encourage 
users to store content to their sites, and users often invest substantial time and 
energy to cultivate their accounts.  Users – and the website themselves – view 
the content posted by users to be proprietary to the users.  Yahoo’s TOS, for 
example, state that “Yahoo does not claim ownership of Content you submit 
or make available for inclusion on the Yahoo Services,” although it does 
claim a “worldwide, royalty-free and non-exclusive license” to it.150  Google, 
too, states that its users “retain ownership of any intellectual property rights” 
and that “what belongs to you stays yours.”151  Google, however, does take a 
“worldwide license” to use the content for various purposes.152  Although 
Facebook’s Statement of Rights and Responsibilities states that users “own 
all of the content and information you post on Facebook,” the company takes 
a “non-exclusive, transferable, sub-licensable, royalty-free, worldwide license 
to use any IP content” posted in connection with Facebook.153 
All three companies, however, state that they may terminate their ser-
vices if users fail to comply with terms or policies.  Google states that it “may 
suspend or stop providing Services to you if you do not comply with our 
terms or policies or if we are investigating suspected misconduct.”154  Yahoo 
 
 149. U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing that no person shall be “deprived of life, 
liberty or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation”).  The Fourteenth Amendment provides: 
 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. 
 150. Yahoo Terms of Service, YAHOO! (last updated Mar. 16, 2012), 
https://policies.yahoo.com/us/en/yahoo/terms/utos/index.html (last visited July 19, 
2015). 
 151. Google Terms of Service, GOOGLE (last modified April 14, 2014), 
http://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/terms/ (last visited July 19, 2015). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, FACEBOOK (last revised Jan. 30, 
2015), https://www.facebook.com/legal/terms (last visited July 19, 2015). 
 154. Google Terms of Service, supra note 151. 
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states that it may “without prior notice, immediately terminate, limit your 
access to or suspend your Yahoo account, any associated email address, and 
access to your Yahoo Services.”155  The reasons for such termination or limi-
tation of access include “breaches or violations of the TOS or other incorpo-
rated agreements or guidelines.”156  Furthermore, Yahoo states that all termi-
nations and suspensions shall be made “in Yahoo’s sole discretion[,]” and 
“Yahoo shall not be liable to you or any third party for any termination of 
your account, any associated email address, or access to the Yahoo Ser-
vices.”157  Facebook states that it may terminate users’ accounts if they “vio-
late the letter or spirit” of their Statement of Rights or Responsibilities or 
“otherwise create risk or possible legal exposure” for the company.158  It will 
notify users of such termination “by email or at the next time you attempt to 
access your account.”159 
Users may find themselves locked out of their accounts without prior 
notice or an opportunity to save their data or notify their contacts.  Users de-
pend on the availability of these sites and have integrated their services into 
their daily lives.  They may store important information on their sites, and 
they may have created strong communities and relationships that are accessi-
ble only through these sites.160  Many users depend on the websites for work-
related activities.161  They view the content they post as their own property.  
Yet, the companies have the power to banish them without prior notice or due 
process. 
Furthermore, this power is one that Internet giants are not afraid to exer-
cise.  While companies should be allowed to terminate or suspend the ac-
counts of users who violate website policies and norms of conduct, the exer-
cise of that power should be subject to some sort of due process or transpar-
ent review process.  Companies can now suspend or terminate accounts with-
out explanation or prior notice.  Users are often confounded and frustrated to 
find that they are locked out for no apparent reason.162  Internet companies 
typically automate customer service and respond to queries via email.  Ter-
minated customers typically have no ability to communicate with an actual 
customer service representative, and efforts to resolve the problem may take 
weeks, even for those users who are eventually reinstated.  The company may 
 
 155. Yahoo Terms of Service, supra note 150. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 153. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Alina Tugend, Barred from Facebook, and Wondering Why, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 19, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/20/your-money/kicked-off-
facebook-and-wondering-why.html?recp=19&_r=0. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. 
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provide no explanation as to why the account was suspended in the first 
place.163 
Internet giants also effectively deprive users of due process by using fo-
rum selection clauses.  For example, Google’s TOS state that all claims relat-
ing to the use of its service “will be litigated exclusively in the federal or state 
courts of Santa Clara County, California, USA, and you and Google consent 
to personal jurisdiction in those courts.”164  A non-California resident wishing 
to sue Google would have to file a lawsuit in California and hire a California-
based attorney.  A typical Google user would not be able to expend the re-
sources to do this and would essentially have no recourse against Google.165  
Some Internet giants impose mandatory arbitration clauses upon their users.  
Microsoft’s service agreement, for example, states that other than small 
claims disputes, users must submit to “individual binding arbitration;” “class 
arbitrations aren’t permitted,” and users are “giving up the right to litigate 
disputes in court before a judge or jury.”166 
3.  Email Scanning and Other Unreasonable Searches and Seizures 
Google, Yahoo, Facebook, and Microsoft all reserve the right to scan or 
analyze user content.  Google’s TOS state that its “automated systems ana-
lyze your content (including emails) to provide you personally relevant prod-
uct features, such as customized search results, tailored advertising and spam 
and malware detection.  This analysis occurs as the content is sent, received, 
 
 163. See id.  One user’s account was disabled for a month for reasons that were 
found to be unfounded.  Id. 
 164. Google Terms of Service, supra note 151. 
 165. Surprisingly, the terms of use of some of the most popular Internet giants 
(Google, Facebook, Yahoo, and Twitter) do not contain mandatory arbitration clauses 
that are common on many other websites.  See Google Terms of Service, supra note 
151; Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 153; Yahoo Terms of Ser-
vice, supra note 150; Twitter Terms of Service, TWITTER (effective May 18, 2015), 
https://twitter.com/tos?lang=en (last visited Sept. 24, 2015).  This may have more to 
do with California state law than any policy decision on the part of these companies 
as all of these companies are located in California and their terms of use specify Cali-
fornia as the governing law.  Yahoo Terms of Service, supra note 150; Google Terms 
of Service, supra note 151; Statement of Rights and Responsibilities, supra note 153.  
On other hand, Microsoft, which has a mandatory arbitration clause, is based in 
Washington and adopts Washington as the governing law.  Arbitration and Dispute 
Resolution, MICROSOFT (last updated Nov. 20, 2014), https://www.microsoft.com/en-
us/Legal/arbitration/default.aspx (last visited July 19, 2015).  The authors suspect that 
given recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions striking down California’s laws limiting 
arbitration, the Internet giants based in California may soon change their Terms of 
Use to impose mandatory arbitration.  See, e.g., AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 
S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 166. Microsoft Services Agreement, MICROSOFT (last updated June 11, 2014), 
http://windows.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/microsoft-services-agreement (last 
visited July 19, 2015). 
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and when it is stored.”167  Yahoo’s TOS state that, “Yahoo may or may not 
pre-screen Content,” and Yahoo: 
[M]ay access, preserve and disclose your account information and 
Content if required to do so by law or in a good faith belief that such 
access preservation or disclosure is reasonably necessary to (i) comply 
with legal process; (ii) enforce the TOS; (iii) respond to claims that 
any Content violates the rights of third parties; (iv) respond to your 
requests for customer service; or (v) protect the rights, property or 
personal safety of Yahoo, its users and the public.168 
Facebook’s Statement of Rights and Responsibilities states that the 
company can “analyze your application, content, and data for any purpose, 
including commercial (such as for targeting the delivery of advertisements 
and indexing content for search).”169 Microsoft Outlook’s TOS state that Mi-
crosoft has the “world right, without charge, to use Content as necessary: to 
provide the Services to you, to protect you, and to improve Microsoft prod-
ucts and services.”170  Microsoft’s Privacy Statement reveals that the compa-
ny may: 
[U]se automated means to isolate information from email, chats, or 
photos in order to help detect and protect against spam and malware 
and to improve the services with new features that make them easier 
to use.  We may also access and use your information and content 
when we are alerted to violations of the Microsoft Services Agree-
ment.171 
Some may argue that data collection by private entities is not as threat-
ening because they are only trying to sell things to us.  Unlike the govern-
ment, private companies do not have police power.  Accordingly, their ability 
to “punish” us based upon information they collect about us is limited to their 
property or contractual rights.  They may be able to terminate our ability to 
access our accounts, but they cannot throw us in jail based upon what they 
find out about us through data mining. 
Yet, Internet giants may also act as agents for or on behalf of govern-
mental entities engaging in what Jack Balkin refers to as “public/private co-
operation or co-optation.”172  As Snowden’s disclosures revealed, the infor-
 
 167. Google Terms of Service, supra note 151. 
 168. Yahoo Terms of Service, supra note 150. 
 169. Facebook Platform Policy, FACEBOOK (last updated March 25, 2015), 
https://developers.facebook.com/policy (last visited July 19, 2015). 
 170. Microsoft Services Agreement, supra note 166. 
 171. Microsoft Privacy Statement, MICROSOFT (last updated July 2015), 
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/privacystatement/ (last visited July 19, 2015). 
 172. See Jack M. Balkin, Old School/New School Speech Regulation, 127 HARV. 
L. REV. 2296, 2298–99 (2014).  Balkin states: 
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mation collected as part of these companies’ efforts to monetize our data 
could be summoned by, and released to, the government.  While the relation-
ship between technology companies and the federal government may not be 
as cozy as it once was in the aftermath of Snowden’s revelations,173 we ex-
pect the cooperative relationship to continue.  As David Schneier has noted, 
corporate and government surveillance are intertwined and support one an-
other in a public private surveillance partnership.174  Most companies’ TOS 
expressly state that user information may be shared with law enforcement or 
governmental authorities.175 
Furthermore, data collection by private entities may affect whether 
someone has a reasonable expectation of privacy worthy of Fourth Amend-
 
 
To the extent that the government does not own the infrastructure of free ex-
pression, it needs to coerce or co-opt private owners to assist in speech regula-
tion and surveillance—to help the state identify speakers and sites that the 
government seeks to watch, regulate, or shut down.  To this end, the govern-
ment may offer a combination of carrots and sticks, including legal immunity 
for assisting the government’s efforts at surveillance and control.  Owners of 
private infrastructure, hoping to reduce legal uncertainty and to ensure an un-
complicated business environment, often have incentives to be helpful even 
without direct government threats. 
 
Id. 
 173. See Devlin Barrett, Danny Yadron & Daisuke Wakabayashi, Apple and Oth-
ers Encrypt Phones, Fueling Government Standoff, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 18, 2014) 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/apple-and-others-encrypt-phones-fueling-government-
standoff-1416367801 (“Technology companies are pushing back more against gov-
ernment requests for cooperation and beefing up their use of encryption” post-
Snowden.). 
 174. SCHNEIER, supra note 9, at 78. 
 175. See, e.g., Privacy Policy, GOOGLE (last modified June 30, 2015), 
http://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/privacy/ (last visited July 19, 2015) (“We will 
share personal information . . . to protect against harm . . . as required or permitted by 
law.”).  See also Data Policy, FACEBOOK (last revised Jan. 30, 2015), 
https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy/other (“We may . . . share your information 
in response to a legal request. . . .  We may also . . . share information when . . . nec-
essary to detect, prevent and address fraud and other illegal activity.”).  Facebook’s 
Privacy Policy also states that it will “use the information we collect” to “prevent 
potentially illegal activities, and to enforce our Statement of Rights and Responsibili-
ties.”  Id.  See also Yahoo’s Terms of Service, which state: 
 
Yahoo may access, preserve and disclose your account information and Con-
tent if required to do so by law or in a good faith belief that such . . . disclo-
sure is reasonably necessary to (i) comply with legal process; (ii) enforce the 
TOS; (iii) respond to claims that any Content violates the rights of third par-
ties; (iv) respond to your requests for customer services; or (v) protect the 
rights, property or personal safety of Yahoo, its users and the public. 
 
Yahoo Terms of Service, supra note 150. 
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ment protection.176  Under the third-party doctrine, the Supreme Court has 
stated that a criminal defendant has no legitimate expectation of privacy in 
information voluntarily conveyed to third parties.177  The Supreme Court’s 
reasoning in that case was based on a distinction between the collection of 
metadata and the collection of content.178  That distinction now seems to be 
increasingly illusory.179  As a result, expansive data collecting conducted by 
Internet giants erodes the constitutional rights of citizens who seek to protect 
themselves from governmental searches.180 
Internet giants’ TOS allow them to police their own sites to prevent ille-
gal activity, not simply respond to governmental requests.  Because they are 
not constrained by constitutional limitations, and because their TOS allow 
them to search their users’ accounts, they have an unprecedented ability to 
ferret out potentially incriminating information.  For example, Google alerted 
Texas police to information that led to the arrest of a child pornography sus-
pect.181  Unlike police, who are prohibited from going on a fishing expedi-
tion, Google regularly scans users’ emails, purportedly in order to furnish 
users with personalized advertisements.  Microsoft, too, recently discovered 
child pornographic images in the course of scanning its users’ accounts.182  
 
 176.  See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742–46 (1979) (finding that defendant 
had no legitimate expectation of privacy in phone numbers he dialed because he knew 
that phone numbers were conveyed to telephone company which records the infor-
mation). 
 177. Id. at 743–44.  For example, the Supreme Court noted that a criminal defend-
ant had no legitimate expectation of privacy in financial information voluntarily con-
veyed to banks.  Id. at 744.  See also Note, Data Mining, Dog Sniffs, and the Fourth 
Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 691, 697–98 (2014) (discussing Smith v. Maryland 
and concluding that, with some exceptions, “the Fourth Amendment leaves unprotect-
ed any information that has fallen or could legally fall into the hands of a private third 
party”). 
 178. Smith, 442 U.S. at 742 (finding that no “search” had occurred for Fourth 
Amendment purposes when the telephone company installed a pen register to record 
the numbers petitioner had dialed because citizens have no reasonable expectation of 
privacy with respect to such information). 
 179. See SCHNEIER, supra note 9, at 20–23 (illustrating the ease with which one 
can deduce content from metadata); ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 748 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (describing how telephony metadata, and especially aggregated 
metadata, can reveal content), vacated and remanded, No. 14-42-CV, 2015 WL 
2097814 (2d Cir. May 7, 2015). 
 180. At the same time, government access to big data is also eroding constitution-
al limitations.  See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable 
Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 327, 331–32 (2015) (predicting that “big data policing” 
may render the reasonable suspicion requirement “practically irrelevant”). 
 181. Alroy Menezes, Google Helps Law Enforcement Crack Down on Child Por-
nography, Defends Policy, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2014), 
http://www.ibtimes.com/google-helps-law-enforcement-crack-down-child-
pornography-defends-policy-1648858. 
 182. Leo Kelion, Microsoft Tip Leads to Child Porn Arrest in Pennsylvania, BBC 
NEWS (Aug. 6, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-28682686. 
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Because these are private companies, they are not subject to the constitutional 
requirement of a warrant.183  While there is undoubtedly little sympathy for a 
child pornographer, Microsoft’s and Google’s ability to engage in what 
would amount to an unlawful search and seizure if conducted by a govern-
mental entity raises disconcerting questions about civil liberty protections in a 
society where Internet giants have all the power of governmental entities but 
are subject to none of the constitutional limitations. 
Elected officials pledge to act in the public interest, and if they fail to do 
so, their constituents may vote them out of office.  In sharp contrast, Internet 
companies have none of these constraints.  Internet giants operate their online 
properties like fiefdoms with the power to manipulate and control users’ 
online activities.  They use wrap contracts to obtain more rights while mini-
mizing their liabilities.  Unlike the government, the Internet giants have no 
mandate to act in the public interest.  On the contrary, they are accountable 
primarily to their shareholders, and their corporate objective is the maximiza-
tion of shareholder profit.  Yet Internet giants – not the government – regulate 
and shape the online world with unprecedented control over what the public 
does, reads, and thinks.  They are the ones – not the government – with the 
unprecedented broad discretion and power to rifle through our virtual papers 
and track our online movements in an attempt to profit off of our contacts, 
behaviors, and habits.  Furthermore, unlike the government, private compa-
nies, in their interactions with consumers, are not limited by constitutional 
protections – and consumers have no right to trial.  The Codes of Conduct are 
governance systems, but they are implemented through the “legislation” of 
TOS.  These TOS establish the rules that govern each site. 
D.  The Best of Both Worlds: Corporations as Quasi-Governmental 
Agencies and as Empowered Citizens 
We have described how Internet giants use wrap contracts and a con-
structed notion of consent to become private regulators and private legislators 
whose rules trump those arrived at through democratic processes.  Today, the 
world inhabited by Internet giants is a grand one.  They enjoy the benefits of 
regulatory power akin to that of a government agency, and in certain respects, 
their power exceeds that of legislatures.  Yet, they still enjoy the rights of 
personhood, perhaps to an unprecedented degree due to recent decisions of 
the Supreme Court – decisions that extend First Amendment protections to 
 
 183. See Avidan Cover, Corporate Avatars and the Erosion of the Populist 
Fourth Amendment, 100 IOWA L. REV. (2015) (describing the third-party doctrine as 
enabling corporations as avatars that are supposed to protect individual privacy inter-
ests but cannot because powerful tech companies function almost like mini-states 
with “vested interests in cooperating with the government”); Jane Bambauer, The Lost 
Nuance of Big Data Policing, 94 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2572448 (advocating reforms of 
the third-party doctrine that would eliminate data collection practices that compro-
mise civil liberties while permitting liberty-enhancing innovations in policing). 
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corporate persons184 and recognize their personhood for the purpose of the 
free exercise of religion under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.185  
Our point here is not to criticize these decisions, but to point out that it is 
peculiar to grant corporate entities the freedoms that natural persons enjoy 
while they exercise powers and enjoy immunities akin to those of the gov-
ernment, yet without the attendant regulatory accountability or oversight. 
The cumulative effect of Internet giants’ power of private legislation 
and the protection afforded them by federal legislation is that Internet giants 
enjoy broad immunity from any claims that might be brought against them 
for offensive content on their websites  – for example, for libel – and from 
any claims that might be brought against them for enforcing their governance 
systems arbitrarily and suppressing users’ rights of free expression or free 
association.  They are also immune from liability if their cooperation with the 
government violates their users’ statutory, constitutional, or contractual pri-
vacy rights.186 
III.  DOWNGRADING “CONSENT” 
Companies claim that users’ consent to intrusive uses of their personal 
data simply because they have clicked on an “accept” icon or continued to 
use a website after having received constructive notice.  Contract law’s pri-
mary objective is to enforce the reasonable expectations of the parties, yet 
Internet giants claim contractual consent to justify intrusive uses of personal 
information that disappoint the reasonable expectations of consumers. 
The problem of online privacy is complex because it involves various 
types of data and a multitude of purposes for which data may be used.187  
Consequently, we believe that there is no “one-size-fits-all” solution to the 
problems outlined in this Article.  A necessary first step, however, is to dras-
tically limit – even eliminate – the role of contractual consent in determining 
the boundaries of what companies may do with personal information.  Inter-
net giants may be private actors, but they function like state entities and exert 
power over important rights.  While private ordering among private actors is 
a cornerstone of the free market economy, a contract between an Internet 
 
 184. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) (recognizing the free 
speech rights of corporate entities). 
 185. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2768–69 (2014) 
(interpreting the term “person” in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act as protect-
ing the religious liberty interests of for-profit corporations). 
 186. See H.R. 3321, 110th Cong. § 5(a) (2007); Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, 50 U.S.C.A § 1881a(h) (West 2015) (immun-
izing companies from liability for cooperating with the government, even if doing so 
violates the terms of their agreements with their customers). 
 187. See Big Data, supra note 69, at 56 (“The context of data use matters tremen-
dously.  Data that is socially beneficial in one scenario can cause significant harm in 
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giant and a consumer is more reminiscent of coercive state power than bar-
gaining among private parties. 
Given the monopolistic power of Internet giants, their fulfillment of tra-
ditional governmental functions, the cooperation between Internet giants and 
the State, and the inapplicability of traditional controls on government abuse, 
contracts between Internet giants and consumers should be viewed as unilat-
erally imposed private legislation, not as bargains.  Furthermore, unlike adhe-
sive contracts in other contexts, the quasi-governmental role of Internet giants 
means that the subject matter of these so-called contracts often involves im-
portant civil and political rights, not simply the maximization of economic 
profit or the furtherance of commercial interests.  Given the absence of the 
traditional commercial justifications that courts have used to avoid reviewing 
the adequacy of bargains, courts should not hesitate to evaluate for fairness 
the terms of purported “contracts” between Internet giants and consumers. 
Legislators, governmental agencies, and policymakers, too, should be 
careful not to inadvertently define consent in the realm of privacy to be satis-
fied through the anemic form of consent associated with form contracting.  
On the contrary, they should take pains to delegitimize consent obtained 
through blanket assent to contract terms.  The use of personal information by 
companies should be permitted only in those instances where consent was 
specific, express, and voluntary. 
“Specific” refers to each particular use of the data.  “Express” means af-
firmative – an opt-in, rather than an opt-out.188  “Voluntary” requires the 
availability of reasonable options, which is particularly important where the 
drafting party is an Internet giant that dominates a particular online activity.  
One click should not be construed to signify blanket assent to all terms con-
tained in a wrap contract.  Companies compete based upon the quality of the 
services offered; they do not compete on the basis of unread wrap contract 
terms.  A requirement of specific assent raises the salience of wrap contracts 
by encumbering and affecting the quality of the customer experience, which 
may make the consent process itself a competitive advantage or disadvantage.  
Making the consent process reflect the bargain itself increases transparency, 
which may, in turn, encourage companies to reconsider their data-collection 
practices.  As long as those data-collection practices remain obscure, there is 
little incentive for companies to restrain themselves or restrict their use of 
data. 
Non-consent should not mean that consumers are barred from participat-
ing in a service over which an Internet giant holds a de facto monopoly, nor 
should non-consent prevent such consumers from continuing to participate in 
a service in which they have vested interests and where there are likely to be 
sunk and switching costs.  Context matters, and permission to use data grant-
 
 188. Other scholars have championed a specific assent approach.  See James Gib-
son, Vertical Boilerplate, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 161, 185–86 (2013); Russell 
Korobkin, The Borat Problem in Negotiation: Fraud, Assent, and the Behavioral Law 
and Economics of Standard Form Contracts, 101 CAL. L. REV. 51, 56 (2013). 
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ed in one context should not automatically transfer to other contexts.189 Busi-
nesses could continue to use consumer personal information to provide ser-
vices under a quasi-contract theory, but the use of data for purposes other 
than to provide services, at a minimum, should be subject to more onerous 
consent requirements. 
Furthermore, given the dominance of Internet giants in the online envi-
ronment, legislators, governmental agencies, and policymakers should move 
away from consent – blanket or specific – altogether as a mechanism for es-
tablishing the boundaries of data collection and use.  Currently, the law re-
quires notice and choice, an approach Daniel Solove refers to as “privacy 
self-management.”190  Solove writes: 
Privacy self-management takes refuge in consent.  It attempts to be 
neutral about substance – whether certain forms of collecting, using or 
disclosing personal data are good or bad – and instead focuses on 
whether people consent to various privacy practices.  Consent legiti-
mizes nearly any form of collection, use, or disclosure of personal da-
ta.191 
Solove argues that privacy self-management fails to provide people with 
meaningful control over their data.192  He makes several proposals to address 
the shortcomings of privacy self-management, including a “coherent ap-
proach to consent” that takes into account “social science discoveries about 
how people make decisions about personal data,” and developing “more sub-
stantive privacy rules,” including those that focus on downstream uses of 
data.193  His views align with a White House commissioned report that rec-
ommended moving away from “notice and choice” – the dominant regulatory 
framework – and toward a “responsible use” framework that would hold data 
collectors and users accountable for the ways that they manage and use da-
ta.194 
We agree that “notice and consent” imposes too heavy a burden upon 
consumers to read, understand, and, in some cases, object to uses of data.  
The government should take a more proactive role in regulating uses of per-
sonal information, a view with which most Americans may agree.  A recent 
study found that 64% of those surveyed believe that the government should 
 
 189. Big Data, supra note 69, at 56 (“[M]ore attention on responsible use does not 
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do more to regulate advertisers.195  Different procedures must be in place 
depending upon the type of data involved and the use of that data.196 
Furthermore, as we have explained, Internet giants like Facebook and 
Google occupy a sui generis role in our society, controlling basic rights of 
citizens with little regulatory oversight. Given the tremendous power of In-
ternet giants over online activity, the primary framework for protecting priva-
cy should not depend upon consent.  To eliminate “consent” as the mecha-
nism by which data practices are sanctioned acknowledges that, in the online 
contracting context, consent is fictive.  Consumers have very little bargaining 
power vis-à-vis Internet giants that control online services and establish busi-
ness practices that affect fundamental online freedoms with little regulatory 
oversight.  Clicking “Agree” may mean only that the consumer has no other 
option if she wants to participate in the modern world.197  Given the reality of 
contractual consent and its fictive nature, private ordering should not be the 
process by which businesses establish – and courts and regulators permit – 
data-collection practices. 
Instead, legislators and policymakers must do the hard work of deter-
mining responsible business practices and establishing regulations that pro-
tect the reasonable expectations of the individual in the use of personal in-
formation.198  We need public laws that eliminate, or at least curtail, the use 
of so-called contracts, which are not based on consent, and of the artificial 
and diluted version of consent sanctioned by contract law.  A bedrock of con-
tract law is to enforce the reasonable expectations of the parties, and the cur-
rent regime of enforcing boilerplate contracts, quite perversely, fails to do so. 
 
 195. Madden, supra note 61, at 30. 
 196. For example, in a recent survey, most Americans said they felt social security 
numbers, health information, and the content of phone conversations was “very sensi-
tive” or “somewhat sensitive.”  Id.  Only 31% felt the same about the “media you 
like.”  Id. 
 197. As Justice Thurgood Marshall noted in his dissenting opinion in Smith v. 
Maryland when discussing an individual’s legitimate expectation of privacy: 
 
Implicit in the concept of assumption of risk is some notion of choice . . . un-
less a person is prepared to forgo use of what for many has become a personal 
or professional necessity, he cannot help but accept the risk of surveillance 
. . . .  It is idle to speak of “assuming” risks in contexts where, as a practical 
matter, individuals have no realistic alternative. 
 
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749–50 (1979) (Marshal, J., dissenting).  Justice 
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CONCLUSION 
Although the Snowden disclosures have focused the public’s attention 
on the government’s intrusive surveillance tactics, the public’s concern over 
private entities’ intrusive data collection and use has been comparatively 
muted.  Companies disclose their wide-ranging and intrusive data-collection 
practices in privacy policies that few individuals read and that are consented 
to only through judicial fictions.  Companies use forms and label them as 
contracts to justify their spying activities, spinning a tale of consent that 
courts have been too willing to accept.  Internet giants’ quasi-governmental 
authority and de facto monopolistic power render their putative agreements 
with private actors imbalanced and coercive.  As state and federal govern-
ments consider how to best protect consumer privacy,199 they should dismiss 
proposals that lean too heavily on consumer consent to sanction collection 
practices.  Contractual consent – at least in its current diluted and fantastical 
form – is an invalid mechanism that distorts rather than reflects consumer 
preferences. 
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